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In his Elements of the Philosophy of Right, G. W. F. Hegel considers ethical love the basis of 
marriage and family, which comprises the state and higher ethical entities. For Hegel, 
marriage should be seen as an immediately ethical relationship. Although marriage is only 
discussed in a small section of the work, it is of great importance in Hegel’s overall ethical 
edifice. In order to capture the deadlocks and dichotomies in Hegel’s account of marriage, I 
use Lacanian psychoanalysis as the methodology of this thesis, thereby mapping the 
distinction between ethical and Romantic love and identifying the philosophical roots of the 
prevailing love conception in contemporary society.  
Hegel’s philosophy of marriage is primarily formulated against two opponents: 
Immanuel Kant and the Romantics. This thesis starts with Hegel’s criticism of Kant by 
paying close attention to the significance of the wedding ceremony in Hegel’s account—an 
element that both Kant and the Romantics consider to be unnecessary. Through examining 
the necessity of the wedding ceremony, I elucidate how the third element, or, the higher 
ethical entity—the big Other—plays a crucial role that irreversibly alters the subject’s 
identity and social position. Then, I turn my attention to J. G. Fichte’s deductive system of 
marriage, which lays a critical foundation for the Romantic conception of love. I investigate 
the relation between subjectivity and objective reality in Fichte’s metaphysics. Moreover, an 
alternative reading of Fichte’s sexual difference through a detour via Lacanian sexuation is 
provided. I make the case that the Fichtean distinction between masculinity and femininity 
can be read as different kinds of desire and enjoyment obtained by male and female subjects. 
In the final chapter, E. T. A. Hoffmann’s The Sandman [Der Sandmann], in which both 
ethical and Romantic love are incorporated, is used as a literary example. I use 
psychoanalytic terms such as transference love, sublimation, idealization as well as the 
relation between courtly love and masochism to unpack the two loving dispositions in the 
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story. Furthermore, I argue that this story is an example of the perverse relation to the big 
Other, as the pervert enjoys an instrumental relationship with the big Other and thereby 
avoids a fully sexual relationship.  
 It should be clear that it is not my aim to impose psychoanalytic terms on Hegel, 
Schlegel, or Hoffmann: instead, these psychoanalytic concepts offer a framework with which 
we can systematically define the different positions on Romantic and ethical love, and 
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The philosophy of marriage and love has a long history. Ideas such as forming a family, 
reproduction, and polygamy have been discussed by philosophers throughout history in both 
the West and the East. However, conceptions of marriage and love have varied across 
historical periods and political contexts. Because marriage is highly interrelated with political 
and social change, scholarly works on the topic tend to debate the meaning of marriage and 
predominantly focus on how different theories of marriage can be applied in contemporary 
societies and discourses. Therefore, it is not surprising that an overwhelming amount of 
literature in political and social philosophy addresses topics such as same-sex marriage, 
feminism, and gender roles (e.g, Firestone 1970; Boonin 1999; Calhoun 2000; Arroyo 2018). 
Works that pay close attention to the history of philosophy and the question of how marriage 
is portrayed by philosophers also tend to apply contemporary values when evaluating texts 
(e.g., Altman 2010; Brooks 2013). The purpose of this thesis is thus to revisit theories of 
marriage in German Idealism and Romanticism without criticizing or “re-writing” them in the 
light of contemporary ideologies. The goal is not so much to provide a clear-cut definition of 
love and marriage or “solutions” to contemporary controversies regarding marriage. Instead, 
my hope is to be faithful to the major philosophical works on marriage within the movements 
of German Idealism and Romanticism, especially works by Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, 
J. G. Fichte, along with a literary example from E. T. A. Hoffmann. It is crucial to note that 
this thesis is not an investigation of the history of marriage; this thesis begins with Hegel’s 
account of marriage by examining the rationale behind his theory. Then, I investigate his 
criticism of his main components and thereby outline the different core positions of 
philosophers and authors through (Lacanian) psychoanalysis.  
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The theory of marriage is a crucial topic in political and moral philosophy insofar as 
marriage as a union is associated with concepts such as the state, religion, love, and sexuality. 
In the West today, it is often believed that the foundation of marriage is mutual love between 
two subjects. However, this has not always been the case throughout history.1 There are many 
ways to define the term “marriage,” and many ideas about the conditions that are necessary in 
order to be considered married. While this thesis does not attempt to offer a historical or 
modern investigation of marriage, I do hope to shed light on the abovementioned debates by 
providing a close reading of philosophers’ and writers’ different accounts of marriage.  
However, before I outline my main arguments and how I will scrutinize these 
different positions in greater detail, I must explain why I have chosen to use (Lacanian) 
psychoanalysis. Why is such a reading of German Idealism and Romanticism needed?  
I must first clarify that my aim is not to impose psychoanalytic terms on the thinkers 
whose works I address but to establish a conversation between philosophy and 
psychoanalysis, which is a “lost” tradition in contemporary philosophical research. This 
means that this thesis is essentially Lacanian, and the methodological purpose of this thesis is 
to call attention to the significance of the connection between Lacanian psychoanalysis and 
philosophy.  
To provide a broader overview, Jacques Lacan started to give seminars on the theme 
“return to Freud.” It is well known that Sigmund Freud was skeptical about philosophy, and 
his methodology is often seen as different from that of most philosophers. Lacan, on the other 
hand, actively attempts to connect psychoanalysis with other disciplines, above all, 
 
1 See Part Three (“The Love Revolution”) of Stephanie Coontz’s Marriage, A History: How Love Conquered Marriage.  
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philosophy. Although Lacan attended Alexandré Kojève’s lectures on Hegel,2 the relation 
between Lacanian psychoanalysis and German Idealism was more explicitly established by 
the Slovenian philosopher, Slavoj Žižek.  
The broader aim of this thesis is to use concepts established by Lacan and Žižek such 
as sublimation and drive, to discern contradiction and ambiguity in Hegel’s account of 
marriage. On the one hand, the subject, as an independent person in his or her own right [für 
mich], seems incomplete; on the other, the subject gains his or her full self-consciousness and 
independence in another person. Marriage is a contradiction whereby two subjects self-
consciously abandon their personalities and identities. The use of psychoanalysis as a method 
corresponds to this Hegelian contradiction and deadlock: in psychoanalysis sexual love is 
above all “a concept that formulates a persisting contradiction of reality” (Zupančič, What is 
Sex 3). Psychoanalysis, as Louis Althusser aptly points out, is itself a conflictual theory that 
requires attempts at “annexation” and “revision” because the truth residing within the theory 
must be revised in order to be neutralized (19). While psychoanalysis identifies the 
conflicting and antagonistic nature of symptoms and problems surrounding the topic of love, 
it is itself part of what it recognizes as a contradiction. This contradiction is captured in the 
main arguments presented throughout this thesis.  
Moreover, this deadlock is central to Lacanian psychoanalysis insofar as what 
differentiates Lacan from other psychoanalysts (theoretical or clinical) is that Lacan looked 
for the contradiction and deadlock situated within the subject’s desire (Žižek, How to Read 
 
2 The early Lacan did not yet occupy himself with the structuralism but rather had a clear “Hegelian” vision. However, his 
understanding of Hegel is far from Hegelian but is instead mediated by Kojève. As Žižek reminds us, “Lacan referred to 
Kojève as his maître [...] Kojève's central aim was precisely to bring together Hegel and Heidegger, i.e., to read Hegel's 
motifs of negativity and, exemplarily, the struggle-to-death between the (future) Master and Slave, through Heidegger's topic 
of being-towards-death” (Less than Nothing 507).  
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Lacan 4). This means that Lacanian psychoanalysis is not used to cure symptoms of 
psychological disturbances; instead, the methodology attempts to engage with reality 
reflected through the subject’s desire. In other words, Lacan believes that every subject is 
always-already pathological, despite the fact that many pathologies may only be realized 
retroactively. Furthermore, Lacanian psychoanalysis is not limited to clinical practices. In his 
teachings, Lacan combines psychoanalysis with other disciplines, including Saussurean 
linguistics, structural anthropology, and philosophy (e.g., Socrates, Plato, Kant, Hegel, 
Heidegger, de Sade).  
Although this thesis is Lacanian, it is not just about Lacan. As Žižek states, “[w]hat 
better way to read Lacan, then, than to practise his mode of reading, to read others’ texts with 
Lacan” (ibid. 5). This is why, instead of writing a thesis introducing different Lacanian 
concepts regarding the topic of love and marriage, it is more meaningful and helpful to 
analyze philosophical and literary texts through Lacanian theories. The other reason for not 
providing a Lacanian glossary is because Lacan’s Seminars were “works-in-progress.” Many 
of his concepts and theories were developed between 1952 and 1980, and during these years, 
Lacan revisited and revised his teachings multiple times, which resulted in him sometimes 
expressing apparently contradictory ideas in different Seminars. This requires readers to 
critically engage with Lacanian theories in an extensive way to obtain a full picture of his 
thought. Therefore, concepts such as the big Other, desire, drive, sublimation, idealization, 
jouissance, and objet petit a are frequently applied and discussed in different contexts 
throughout this thesis, with their meanings varying depending on the context. Because Lacan 
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himself elucidates his teaching differently based upon specific contexts and circumstances, 
avoiding generalization of any concept is a faithful approach to his teaching.3  
My project should not in any way be seen as a literary analysis that attempts to offer a 
psychoanalytic reading of a particular novel or story; it is a thesis that starts from Hegel’s 
ethics and follows his criticism to unfold and materialize his theory. Similarly, it should not 
be seen as a historical investigation of the encounters and rivalry between the philosophers. It 
is also crucial to note that the purpose of psychoanalysis is never to provide a straightforward 
solution to a symptom or problem, nor do I intend to claim that the psychoanalytic approach 
is the best way to read any of the texts that I deal with in my thesis. The nature of 
psychoanalysis, especially in the Lacanian lineage, is essentially non-dogmatic. 
The thesis starts with a discussion of Hegel’s account of marriage in the Elements of 
the Philosophy of Right [Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts], which he mainly 
formulates to confront two different beliefs: Kant’s marriage as a contract and Romantic love. 
Hegel’s account of marriage and ethical love is established on the condition that two subjects 
voluntarily give up their autonomy to form an ethical union, marriage.4 This ethical union is 
actualized and mediated by language and signs at the wedding ceremony. In order to grasp 
the logic of Hegelian ethical love at stake, I pay close attention to the function of the wedding 
 
3 Indeed, there are helpful psychoanalytic dictionaries, such as The Language of Psychoanalysis by Jean Laplanche and Jean-
Bertrand Pontalis, that provide the original Freudian definitions of concepts (which is what Lacan works from). However, it 
is important to note that Lacanian concepts such as the big Other are not included in the above dictionary.  
4 In PR, the term “ethical love” [die sittliche Liebe] is only mentioned in paragraph 172: “Durch eine Ehe konstituiert sich 
eine neue Familie, welche ein für sich Selbständiges gegen die Stämme oder Häuser ist, von denen sie ausgegangen ist; die 
Verbindung mit solchen hat die natürliche Blutsverwandtschaft zur Grundlage, die neue Familie aber die sittliche Liebe.” 
Although the term is only mentioned after the sections dedicated to marriage, it is clear that Hegel believes that ethical love 
is the foundation of marriage and family.  
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ceremony, which both Kant and the Romantics thought unnecessary, although for different 
reasons. For Kant, the contract that enacts a marriage of two subjects is no different from the 
contract that protects the subject’s possessions. In other words, Kant views the subject’s sex 
organs as equivalent to objects and properties. Kant goes so far as to claim that the married 
couple’s possession of each other is only granted and actualized after the use of sexual organs 
(MM §27). The Romantics believe that formalities such as the wedding ceremony are 
external obstacles to authentic love. Hegel takes a different standpoint insofar as he believes 
these so-called external obstacles enact and actualize the most ethical love, making it 
possible. Primarily drawing on the existing scholarly work that bridges German Idealism and 
psychoanalysis, I elaborate and expand on arguments that have been made in the field and 
hope to contribute to the Hegelian, Lacanian, and newly established Zizekian scholarship. 
The psychoanalytic approach helps to discern the role of public recognition in the wedding 
ceremony. This symbolic ceremony is not merely a formal recognition of the wedded couple 
by the community, but more importantly, it is a recognition of the subjectivity of the two 
parties involved. In PR, Hegel does not specify who this third party really is. Lacanian theory 
(and Žižek, who points this out explicitly) reveals that this third element is the big Other—the 
subject supposed to know [S.s.S. subjet supposé savoir] (Lacan, Seminar XI 232; Žižek, 
“Hegel on Marriage” 4). The Lacanian interpretation enables us to understand that this third 
party in Hegel’s account of marriage is not someone or something external per se; instead, it 
is precisely this “external” third party that changes the very subjective position and provides 
the subject with the most immediate autonomy.5 
 
5 Another MA thesis that deals with the topic of Hegel on marriage by Joshua Bisig rightfully identifies the necessity of the 
wedding ceremony. He argues that the reasons behind this necessity are the performative act and the recognition of the 
community. His first reason is plausible, yet the second reason he proposes does not convey the transformation that the 
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One of Hegel’s main opponents, Kant, infamously claims that the wedding ceremony 
is not necessary insofar as the couple are not actually wedded until the marriage is 
consummated through sex. However, I argue that although the wedding ceremony is absent, 
the big Other is nevertheless present in Kant’s contractual marriage. In order to decode the 
role of the big Other, I take up Žižek’s homology, which compares Kant to the 
psychoanalytic desire, and Hegel to drive (Less than Nothing 496). The main argument is that 
while Kant’s moral subjects pursue impossible reciprocity, that is, desire. The Hegelian 
ethical subjects correspond to drive insofar as the subjects are always-already satisfied in the 
process of pursuit, regardless of the external qualities of the partner.  
The second chapter turns to Hegel’s criticism of the Romantics, which I argue should 
first be seen as a criticism of Fichte. Fichte, whose philosophical system provides the critical 
vocabulary for German Romanticism, believes that love and marriage were essentially the 
same. He radically claims that a loving disposition automatically gives rise to a marriage 
union, an idea accepted by many Romantics, including Friedrich Schlegel. From a 
philosophical historical point of view, it is not an overstatement to say that Fichte was one of 
the first philosophers to promote this revolution of love. For Fichte, feeling and autonomy 
should be maintained and actively pursued within a marriage union. Indeed, Fichte’s 
arguments might make perfect sense from today’s perspective, and it might be surprising to 
hear that Hegel, who wrote the PR 20 years after Fichte proposed his theory of marriage, still 
claimed that the form of arranged marriages is what he considers truly ethical. I investigate 
the reasons behind Fichte’s omission of the symbolic ceremony and argue that, unlike Kant’s 
account, Fichte’s deductive account of marriage entirely excludes the role of the big Other 
 
subjects must undergo themselves. In other words, his argument fails to recognize the connection between the public and 
subjectivity. 
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insofar as Fichte sees the big Other as an “external intruder” in the subject’s autonomy and 
subjectivity. Indeed, Fichte is often perceived as the philosopher of subjective Idealism. 
Hegel made many explicit and implicit references to Fichte and criticized Fichtean selfhood 
[Ichheit].6 Psychoanalysis makes it clear that Hegel’s criticism of Fichte is not that he is too 
subjective but that Fichte’s subjectivity is only established on the basis that it is part of 
objective conditions. Fichte’s deductive marriage is essentially a deduction of subjectivity—
freedom in the marriage is only achieved when nature and reason grant the union.  
The remaining part of the second chapter deals with the question of sexual difference 
in Fichte. Fichte is infamously understood as the “sexist” philosopher because of his claim 
that the destiny of a woman is love (FA §4). This claim is commonly seen as anti-feminist in 
various studies (e.g., Coontz 149). While this reading is justified in the context of today’s 
ideological discourses, it was not a valid argument in Fichte’s time. Therefore, I provide an 
alternative analysis of Fichte’s sexual difference through a detour via Lacanian sexuation. 
Hereby, I argue that masculinity and femininity in Fichte can be seen as different kinds of 
desire. The broader scope of the second chapter thus corresponds to today’s post-modern 
gender discourse. Psychoanalysis, unlike gender theory, does not presume the existence of 
the gender binary. In other words, the rejection of a non-binary gender or biological sex 
already assumes that two opposite sexes exist (e.g., masculine vs. feminine). As Juliet 
Mitchell writes in her introduction to the essay collection Feminine Sexuality, psychoanalysis 
does not adhere to the sociocultural distinction of gender that is widespread in the media 
today but instead makes the point that “a person is formed through their sexuality, it could 
 
6 Works that include such references include but are not limited to the section on Irony and Morality in PR, Lectures on 
Aesthetics [Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik], the section on Morality in The Phenomenology of Spirit [Phänomenologie des 
Geistes], and The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy [Differenz des Fichteschen und 
Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie].  
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not be ‘added’ to him or her” (2). Firstly, this implies that in psychoanalysis, sexuality is not 
a biological concept; moreover, it cannot be seen as a sociocultural concept insofar as 
socially constructed gender tacitly gives consent to this biological distinction. The 
sociocultural conception of gender is essentially built upon (yet argues against) biological 
sex. So, what psychoanalysis tries to argue here is that sexuality is what shapes a person in 
terms of desire. This is also the ultimate purpose of psychoanalysis. Contrary to the well-
known and clichéd criticism that psychoanalysis focuses too much on sexuality, 
psychoanalysts believes that sexuality reflects a person’s most immediate and honest desire 
and enjoyment. In other words, it is not sexuality per se that forms identities, but rather it is 
the desire and enjoyment that comes from sexuality that constitutes a subject’s identity. 
After providing a close reading of the passages from the abovementioned 
philosophers that deal with marriage and love, in the third chapter, I outline my argument 
with reference to the story of The Sandman, which responds to both standpoints. Although 
The Sandman does not deal with the topic of marriage, I argue it can be read as a story that 
epitomizes both Hegel’s ethical love and Romantic love. I make the case that this story is 
about a pervert who enjoys an instrumental relationship with the big Other to avoid a fully 
sexual relationship. Hoffmann’s The Sandman has been extensively discussed by 
psychoanalysts and psychoanalytic critics since Freud. However, instead of focusing on the 
uncanny aspect of the story, I call attention to the two different kinds of love portrayed in the 
story. In so doing, I not only provide an alternative reading of The Sandman but also 
demonstrate Hoffmann’s rejection of Romantic desire and idealization.  
Hoffmann portrays a “love triangle” between the (masochistic) pervert Nathanael, the 
active lover Clara, and the passive automaton Olimpia. Following Mladen Dolar’s argument 
(“Lacan and the Uncanny” 9), I use psychoanalytic concepts such as transference love and 
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perversion in courtly love to analyze the emergence and dissolution of the artificially 
produced love between Nathanael and Olimpia. The reason Nathanael falls in love with 
Olimpia is two-fold: first, it is a case of “mistaken identity” insofar as Nathanael deceives 
himself into believing that Olimpia is the “analyst” who holds the solution that will resolve 
his childhood trauma (Fink, Lacan on Love 2; Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More 159). 
Second, Nathanael loves Olimpia precisely because of her status of impossibility and 
unattainability. Nathanael is the masochistic knight who carefully controls the reflexive 
distance from his Lady-object. The reason that Nathanael pursues Olimpia is precisely 
because he cannot attain her. In this chapter, I introduce the concepts of sublimation and 
idealization, making the case that Hoffmann attempts to criticize the idealization of the 
subject in Romantic love. 
Without doubt, many positions in this thesis might seem peculiar from today’s 
standpoint. Rather than romanticizing love and marriage, thinkers such as Hegel and Lacan 
provided a radically different perspective on love and marriage that may not be considered 
“ethical” today. What is crucial about Hegelian and Lacanian ethical love is not so much 
finding the “right” person; instead, one can even claim what is right in their ethics is precisely 
what is not right. In their discourses, this “unmatch” is what results in the most ethical form 
of love. This is why Lacan believes that psychoanalysis “has brought a very important change 
of perspective on love by placing it at the center of ethical experience” (Seminar VII 8). 
Although the thesis primarily concerns the topic of marriage and love, some 
discussions extend beyond marriage itself. For example, both the symbolism of the wedding 
ceremony and Nathanael’s relation to the big Other hint at the therapeutic effect of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis: although the big Other is considered the subject supposed to know (Seminar 
XI 232), the big Other knows only when the subject attributes the knowledge to the big Other. 
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Therefore, working on one’s symptoms is really working on and against oneself. Further, this 
thesis does not address the role that marriage and family play in the overall philosophical 
systems of Kant, Hegel, and Fichte and their concepts of ethical and moral life. Marriage is a 
broad topic insofar as it never only pertains to two subjects and their inner feelings for each 
other. While there are many aspects of marriage could be further discussed, this thesis cannot 
address all of them due to space limitations. However, I hope this thesis will successfully 
demonstrate how philosophical and literary texts can be read with Lacan and by revisiting 
psychoanalysis. Just as Lacan infamously stated the necessity to return to Freud and Žižek 
called attention to the necessity to return Hegel, it is now our turn to “return to Lacan.” As I 

















Chapter 1 The Resolution and Autonomy of the Self: G. W. F. Hegel’s 
Ethical Love and Wedding Ceremony 
Marriage is at the ethical core of Hegel’s PR insofar as he claims that permanent property and 
the institution of marriage constitute the basis of states and civilized social life (§170). 
Marriage is or should be, the “immediate ethical relationship” [das unmittelbare sittliche 
Verhältnis] that forms an intimate union (i.e., the family); this union does not only fulfill the 
social norms and ethical duties in the broader context of civil society and the state but also 
denotes and transforms one’s internal subjectivity and spirituality into an external form 
(§161). Yet, surprisingly enough, a topic that constitutes Hegel’s ethical edifice has not 
drawn much scholarly attention in the Hegelian discourse. Major Hegelian works on PR have 
not paid particular attention to Hegel’s constitution of marriage (e.g., Taylor 1979; Wood 
1990); in particular, they have failed to note the importance of the wedding ceremony. 
Furthermore, among those who discuss Hegel and marriage, Alice Ormiston (2004) 
overlooked the aspect of the wedding ceremony. Moreover, much existing scholarship 
(Landes 1981; Pateman 1988; Mills 1966) has chosen to focus on gender roles and inequality 
from today’s post-modern viewpoint, arguing that Hegel’s philosophy is problematic from a 
(neo-)feminist perspective. This moralistic reading prevails over historical facts, impeding 
understanding of Hegel’s work, since today’s discourse and standards cannot be used to 
measure a period of history in which such ideologies did not exist. Instead, Hegel’s 
philosophical enterprise should be understood in his own context.  
 Hegel’s account of marriage is formulated against two main opponents: Immanuel 
Kant’s contractual theory of marriage and the Romantics, above all Friedrich Schlegel. While 
Hegel’s critique of Romantic love is extensively discussed in the second chapter, in this 
chapter I primarily deal with his formulation of marriage by examining the symbolic function 
of the wedding ceremony. I provide a detour via Lacanian psychoanalysis by translating 
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Hegel’s arguments into psychoanalytic terms, such as the level of enunciation and the big 
Other. By scrutinizing the role of the big Other at the wedding ceremony, I argue that the big 
Other is the higher authority who confirms the marriage and that the vows exchanged by the 
subjects are inscribed into the big Other’s vocabulary, thereby permanently shifting the 
subjects’ position and identity. I then take up Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s contractual marriage 
by mapping the rift between Kant’s and Hegel’s theories into Lacanian concepts of desire and 
drive.7 In doing so, I elucidate Kant’s moral law, which requires the subjects to achieve 
impossible reciprocity. This impossibility, which is structured around lack, corresponds to the 
Lacanian topology of desire. Contrastingly, the Hegelian subject always-already knows the 
contradiction and reversal of marriage but still voluntarily enters the union. The Hegelian 
marriage therefore bears a resemblance to the Lacanian drive.  
 An important component of marriage for Hegel is the wedding ceremony, as the bond 
between the married couple is only ethically constituted only after this proceeding (PR §164). 
Hegel himself did not provide a satisfying explanation of why the wedding ceremony plays 
such a crucial role. In his essay “Hegel on Marriage,” the Slovenian philosopher Žižek 
alludes to this subsequent element (i.e., the symbolic ceremony) in Hegel’s ethics and 
political philosophy and provides us with an initial explanation. Žižek argues that the 
wedding ceremony is “performative,” and that during this ceremony, the sexual link is 
inscribed into the big Other, who radically changes the subjective position of the couple 
through their exchange of their spoken vows (“Hegel on Marriage” 3–4). Žižek claims that 
Hegel’s limitation lies in the fact that he does not point out “a drive that gets thwarted as to 
 
7 This homology is borrowed from Žižek’s Less than Nothing (496). Colby Chubbs’ thesis Hegel avec Kleist: On Marriage 
also employs this homology. The difference between my argument and Chubbs’ is that he works from the “Entschluss” 
(resolve, resolution) in marriage in contrast to “Entscheidung” (decision), yet I focus on desire and drive in relation to the 
question of subjectivity (20–21).  
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its natural goal (reproduction) and thereby explodes into an infinite, properly meta-physical 
passion” (“Hegel on Marriage” 1). I would like to make the case that this interpretation is 
inaccurate, as Žižek diminishes Hegel’s ethical edifice into something that is strictly 
“transformed/civilized” (ibid.).  Although some of Hegel’s writings might give rise to this 
explanation (such as his remark on arranged marriage), I argue that Hegel nevertheless 
allowes the space for this “meta-physical passion” that alters the very essence and substance 
of sexuality. Thus, this chapter (and the following chapter) elaborate on Žižek’s essay, 
examining the role of the wedding ceremony in greater detail. Herewith, I argue that the 
wedding ceremony plays a critical, if not decisive, role in Hegel’s ethical love. Moreover, it 
is precisely because of the performance at this ceremony that the subjects concerned 
voluntarily surrender themselves to the ethical union by giving up their subjectivity; this 
process results in the “non-subjectivized” drive.  
 
Hegel’s Ethical Love  
Hegel’s constitution of love is primarily outlined in his discussion on marriage in PR: 
Die Familie hat als die unmittelbare Substantialität des Geistes seine sich 
empfindende Einheit, die Liebe, zu ihrer Bestimmung, so daß die Gesinnung ist, das 
Selbstbewußtsein seiner Individualität in dieser Einheit als an und für sich seiender 
Wesentlichkeit zu haben, um in ihr nicht als eine Person für sich, sondern als Mitglied 
zu sein. (§158)  
This passage demonstrates that the goal of falling in love, getting married, and founding a 
family is to surrender one’s autonomous individuality and thereby establish a higher organic 
ethical unity. For Hegel, love emerges at the very moment of forming such a unity: as he 
aptly argues, love is both the “production” [Hervorbringen] and the “resolution” [Auflösung] 
of surrendering one’s self-consciousness (ibid.). What Hegel pointes out here is a 
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predicament in every ethical marriage: on the one hand, the subject feels incomplete as an 
independent person in his or her own right [für mich]; on the other, the subject gains his or 
her full self-consciousness and independence in another person. Marriage is essentially a 
contradiction and deadlock, in which two people self-consciously abandon their personalities 
and self-identities. To illustrate what I mean by calling the Hegelian marriage a “deadlock,”8 
I showcase the Lacanian conception of the drive in a later section.  
 
The Importance of the Wedding Ceremony  
Although a crucial element of Hegel’s ethical love, the importance of the wedding ceremony 
is overlooked by many major Hegelian scholars. David Ciavatta, as an example, believes that 
the commitment between the couple arises from the everyday interaction in marriage life as 
opposed to the expressive, outspoken vows that each makes to the other during the wedding 
ceremony:  
If I feel betrayed when I discover that my spouse has been keeping something from 
me—that she has been treating some aspect of her life as estranged from our 
relation—I appeal, not to some explicit, reflectively stipulated vow of honesty we 
made to each other when we first were married, but rather to the actual, concrete 
bonds of mutual familiarity that join us in our everyday dealings. The actual, shared 
life we have come to live is itself the expression of our commitment to each other—a 
durable, living actualization of spirit that says more than any contractual commitment 
would—and it is precisely to this that we are most directly answerable as spouses. 
(104–105) 
 
8 The word “deadlock” is used by Žižek in many of his works, where he uses it to capture the fundamental predicament in 
human desire.  
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The problem of this kind of reading is that it neglects the wedding ceremony in Hegel’s 
ethics, to which the writer devotes only a paragraph; thus, many questions arise in relation to 
Hegel’s extensive discussion on the topic. Examples of such questions are why, if vows are 
really unimportant, Hegel states that the bond between the couple is not ethically constituted 
until the completion of the wedding ceremony, in which language acts as the “most spiritual 
existence of the spiritual” [das geistigste Dasein des Geistigen]? (PR §78, §164). 
Furthermore, in the same paragraph, Hegel emphasizes the role the church plays in the 
actuality of marriage. If what really matters in marriage is only the everyday life that comes 
after the ceremony, then why does Hegel accentuate the necessity of the mediation of the 
third party, given that this third party only appears at the ceremony as an embodiment of 
formality and bureaucracy and is not part of married life? Is it not in this case the church, or, 
even more radically, the entire wedding ceremony, that becomes unnecessary and 
superfluous? And, if so, why does Hegel criticize Kant precisely because Kant believes that 
the ceremony can be omitted? Would Hegel’s account of marriage not be equivalent to 
Kant’s contractual marriage, as the actual confirmation and actualization of the marriage do 
not take place until married life begins, which happens only after the (“unnecessary”) 
ceremony?  
 Clearly, neglecting wedding ceremony does not faithfully capture what Hegel 
believes to be ethical love and union and fails to explain Hegel’s formulation against his main 
opponents (Kant and the Romantics). Therefore, the wedding ceremony cannot be treated as 
something not indispensable; instead, the performative function of the wedding ceremony 
that enacts the confirmation of marriage in Hegel’s ethics must be acknowledged.  
 
The Performativity of the Wedding Ceremony  
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The wedding ceremony is an inevitable element to enact the marriage insofar as the language 
and vows exchanged between the two subjects are not a mere formality but the performative 
speech act par excellence that conveys an objective significance. Moreover, it is required that 
a third party, or a higher authority, witnesses, recognizes, and thereby actualizes the marriage, 
as Hegel writes, “Die objektive Bestimmung, somit die sittliche Pflicht, ist, in den Stand der 
Ehe zu treten” (PR §162). Here, Hegel clearly distinguishes marriage from love, as getting 
married does not equate to an internal, subjective process such as two lovers passionately 
falling in love with each other. On the contrary, this disposition is public and requires 
objectivity to measure its ethicality. Thus, the wedding ceremony is not a discursive element 
that has to take place after the disposition of love; conversely, the wedding ceremony is what 
enables the loving disposition, and the disposition would have otherwise been impossible. In 
order to discern what Hegel means by the “objective determination” [objektive Bestimmung], 
in this section of the chapter I first provide a close reading of paragraph 164 in PR, where 
Hegel explicitly discusses the role of the wedding ceremony. I focus on the performative 
speech acts (i.e., the vows exchanged between couples). To unpack the role of the third party, 
I turn my attention to the Lacanian concept, the big Other, translating Hegel’s mysterious 
“third party” into a psychoanalytic concept.  
In §164, Hegel claims that a disposition cannot be called marriage until the wedding 
ceremony is completed under the witness and mediation of a third party, or, differently put, a 
higher authority. Hegel’s thought on this matter deserves to be quoted at length:    
Wie die Stipulation des Vertrags schon für sich den wahrhaften Übergang des 
Eigentums enthält (§ 79), so macht die feierliche Erklärung der Einwilligung zum 
sittlichen Bande der Ehe und die entsprechende Anerkennung und Bestätigung 
desselben durch die Familie und Gemeinde (daß in dieser Rücksicht die Kirche 
eintritt, ist eine weitere, hier nicht auszuführende Bestimmung) die förmliche 
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Schließung und Wirklichkeit der Ehe aus, so daß diese Verbindung nur durch das 
Vorangehen dieser Zeremonie als der Vollbringung des Substantiellen durch das 
Zeichen, die Sprache, als das geistigste Dasein des Geistigen (§ 78), als sittlich 
konstituiert ist. Damit ist das sinnliche, der natürlichen Lebendigkeit angehörige 
Moment in sein sittliches Verhältnis als eine Folge und Akzidentalität gesetzt, welche 
dem äußerlichen Dasein der sittlichen Verbindung angehört, die auch in der 
gegenseitigen Liebe und Beihilfe allein erschöpft sein kann. (PR §164) 
The inclusion of a wedding ceremony is crucial because, to Hegel, the ethical core of 
marriage specifically resides within a wedding ceremony. As Žižek rightfully points out, 
unlike the Romantics (e.g., Friedrich Schlegel) who believe that the ethical core is the 
passionate love while the marriage itself is nothing but an external contract, Hegel believes 
that “the external ceremony is precisely not merely external” (“Hegel on Marriage” 3). It is 
through this ceremony that the externality between the two distinct subjects with different 
personalities is eliminated and the internality of the two subjects, which enables them to form 
an intimate ethical union, is created. During this ceremony, the so-called bureaucratic 
formality is not something external that has nothing to do with the subjects’ personality and 
spirituality. Instead, it is the moment that the ethical union is confirmed, and the identity and 
autonomy of the parties concerned are transformed by the formality. This formality is what 
Lacan calls the big Other.  
However, before moving to the discussion of the function of the big Other, we must 
answer the question of what or who exactly this big Other is, or, in other words, why the big 
Other is the third party in Hegel’s account of marriage? The concept of the big Other is, 
perhaps, not only one of the most complex Lacanian terms but one which Lacan frequently 
mentioned throughout his analytic and teaching career. Lacan uses “the big Other” so 
frequently that no simple definition is adequate. The meaning of the term should be 
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interpreted according to the specific context at hand. What is at stake is the subject’s relation 
to and enjoyment of the big Other, as this is a critical factor to distinguish different kinds of 
pathology. For example, what makes a person hysterical is the struggle to accept the fact that 
she is the object of the big Other’s enjoyment, insofar as she finds it intolerable to be used as 
a mere object and nothing more. A pervert serves the big Other’s enjoyment and is the 
“instrument of the big Other’s enjoyment” (Žižek, Less than Nothing 92).  I discuss this in 
chapter three, using a literary example from E. T. A. Hoffmann.  
For present purposes, I provide a brief overview of the concept of the big Other and 
its relation to other relevant Lacanian concepts in this chapter. In Seminar Ⅱ, Lacan 
introduces the difference between the two others for the first time: the other with a small “o” 
and the big Other (236). This distinction remains central in Lacan’s analytic practices: the 
analyst must differentiate A (Autre; Other) and a (autre; other) so that he or she can situate 
him- or herself in the place of the big Other instead of the other. Unlike the other, which is 
the reflection of the ego that is situated in the imaginary order, the big Other is the language 
and law, which is inscribed in the symbolic dimension. The big Other must be considered “a 
locus, the locus in which speech is constituted” (Lacan, Seminar III 274). Lacan’s argument 
for this assertion is that speech and language are not controlled by our consciousness. Instead, 
they originate from outside consciousness; hence, the unconscious is the discourse of the 
Other: 
If I have said that the unconscious is the Other’s discourse (with a capital O), it is in 
order to indicate the beyond in which the recognition of desire is tied to the desire for 
recognition.  
In other words, this other is the Other that even my lie invokes as a guarantor of the 
truth in which my lie subsists.  
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Here we see that the dimension of truth emerges with the appearance of language. 
(“The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious” Écrits 436) 
The big Other, in Lacan’s eyes, is the guarantor of the truth, and the truth is revealed through 
language. To put it differently, the big Others are the true subjects that reside somewhere 
which the subject cannot reach: 
They are on the other side of the wall of language, there where in principle I never 
reach them. Fundamentally, it is them I’m aiming at every time I utter true speech, but 
I always attain a’, a’’, through reflection. I always aim at true subjects, and I have to 
be content with shadows. The subject is separated from the Others, the true ones, by 
the wall of language. (Lacan, Seminar Ⅱ 244)  
Lacan continues to claim that it is the big Others to whom the subject tries to reach out and 
address in the speech, but what the subject receives at the end is nothing but the echo of the 
others (ibid.).  
So, can we equate the analyst in an analytic session to the big Other? In the last years 
of Lacan’s teaching, he no longer necessarily considers the analyst to be someone who 
occupies the privileged position of the big Other but as someone who exposes the big Other’s 
desire through transference that places the unconscious into the realm of the big Other. As 
Mladen Dolar accurately explains, the analyst is the “material token of this, the shorthand of 
the Other” (“The Speaking Lion” 15), or, differently put, the desire of the analyst is a kind of 
“white desire” (Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder 168). Hence, the analyst is the courier of 
the big Other, who helps the analysand to understand that the big Other wants something 
from him or her, although what the big Other really wants remains unclear to the analyst.  
Žižek uses an apt example to present the big Other in his book Less than Nothing: he 
recalls a story that a lady from Germany had told him about how she had to seduce her 
husband once a week only for the sake of sharing the story with her psychoanalyst so she 
 21 
could claim she still had some sort of sex life (91). The fact that the lady tried to pretend and 
make an appearance in front of the analyst enabled the analyst to become the big Other in this 
context. The big Other was thus not an immediate part of her private life, but, rather, the 
subject that she constantly attempted to approach and convince.  
One may argue that, considering Hegel’s background and immense interest in 
theology as well as the historical context, the big Other for Hegel is undoubtedly God, but is 
God really a fair equation of the big Other? This question is not as easy to answer as it 
appears. Saint Augustine responds to this crucial question by posing another seemingly 
simple yet strikingly pertinent one: why is a confession necessary if God already has full 
access to what we are thinking? (Žižek, Less than Nothing 95). The problem at stake is the 
level of enunciation. Even if God already knows my dirty secret, I should still confess it to 
him because the moment I articulate my thoughts fully and openly, the position of 
enunciation completely differs. My dirty secret is now inscribed into the realm of the big 
Other, leaving myself no possibility of regretting or undoing.  
Therefore, the confession to God is a rather subjective matter. In the preface to PS, 
Hegel outlines the relationship between the subject and God. In the dialectic of recognition 
[Anerkennung], the presence of a “subjective” mediator is required:  
Das Bedürfnis, das Absolute als Subjekt vorzustellen, bediente sich der Sätze: Gott ist 
das Ewige, oder die moralische Weltordnung, oder die Liebe usf. In solchen Sätzen ist 
das Wahre nur geradezu als Subjekt gesetzt, nicht aber als die Bewegung des sich in 
sich selbst Reflektierens dargestellt. Es wird in einem Satze der Art mit dem Worte 
»Gott« angefangen. Dies für sich ist ein sinnloser Laut, ein bloßer Name; erst das 
Prädikat sagt, was er ist, ist seine Erfüllung und Bedeutung; der leere Anfang wird nur 
in diesem Ende ein wirkliches Wissen. Insofern ist nicht abzusehen, warum nicht vom 
Ewigen, der moralischen Weltordnung usf. oder, wie die Alten taten, von reinen 
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Begriffen, dem Sein, dem Einen usf., von dem, was die Bedeutung ist, allein 
gesprochen wird, ohne den sinnlosen Laut noch hinzuzufügen. Aber durch dies Wort 
wird eben bezeichnet, daß nicht ein Sein oder Wesen oder Allgemeines überhaupt, 
sondern ein in sich Reflektiertes, ein Subjekt gesetzt ist. (PS 26-27) 
Hegel argues that the existence of God is only meaningful when the subject gives meaning to 
it. God becomes the subject supposed to know only when the subject consciously confesses 
to God. The process of confession is necessary to enable God to become the subject who 
possesses the knowledge and “dirty secrets” of the subject, the big Other. The matter of God 
and subjectivity is discussed in the second chapter.  
Žižek’s summary of this issue is thought-provoking: he suggests that what we are 
encountering here is two different roles of the big Other. The first big Other is the “subject 
supposed to know” [S.s.S. subjet supposé savoir] (Lacan, Seminar XI 232), while the second 
big Other is “the agent of pure appearance,” or someone supposed not to know (Less than 
Nothing 95). Therefore, as long as I do not confess, God is nothing but a pure appearance to 
me; God does not know. Once I confess, God becomes God that knows.  
Another point is that this big Other is not simply some religious or mysterious figure 
and, therefore, should not be reduced to “an anonymous symbolic field” (Žižek, Less than 
Nothing 92). Although the big Other may have a mysterious appearance, it can be embodied 
in many concrete persons and roles. 
To return to the wedding ceremony, we see that the subject’s internalization is not 
what makes the subject realize that he or she voluntarily enters marriage. The decision is not 
taken because of an excessive amount of passionate love or feelings. The role of the big 
Other in Hegel’s account of marriage should be read as contradictory: one the one hand, it is 
something external to the subject, a third party, that enacts and actualizes the marriage and 
makes the wedded couple become One. On the other hand, this big Other is not completely 
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irrelevant to the subject insofar as it exists only if the subject acknowledges it and is willing 
to shift the level of enunciation. The big Other is the higher ethical authority that ties the 
married couple together and makes them harder to separate than they would have thought: 
  Es ist aber eine dritte sittliche Autorität gefordert, welche das Recht der Ehe, der 
sittlichen Substantialität, gegen die bloße Meinung von solcher Gesinnung und gegen 
die Zufälligkeit bloß temporärer Stimmung usf. festhält, diese von der totalen 
Entfremdung unterscheidet und die letztere konstatiert, um erst in diesem Falle die 
Ehe scheiden zu können (PR §176).  
Then, what exactly is the performativity of the wedding ceremony? Why is this 
performance not merely a performance? Why does Hegel think this seemingly superfluous, 
discursive element is a necessity? During a ceremony, the subjects exchange vows through 
language to inscribe the symbolic status of marriage into the big Other without knowing how 
the language itself will affect them. As one could argue, the purpose of vows is to gain public 
recognition so that the marriage becomes actualized by the public —but who is this public? 
This public recognition is more than having someone play an external role in announcing the 
marriage. This public is the big Other, in front of whom the wedded couple makes an 
appearance and with whom they register their most honest desires. The big Other is the public 
domain that effectuates the marriage, and it is only with the approval of the big Other that the 
marriage union can be dissolved.9 
 
9 The debate on who is the big Other is a rather immaterial question here. The big Other during the ceremony should be 
considered whoever officiates the marriage. Nevertheless, the big Other should not be read as the State because we must 
remember that, according to Hegel’s narrative, the State still has not entered this stage of ethical life [Sittlichkeit]. 
Everything that takes place within the family (including love, marriage, family duties) is still, in a sense, prior to the State. 
Thus, equating the big Other to the State is misleading in the context of Hegel’s argument.  
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In other words, the purpose of vows is not for the couple to promise each other how 
much they love each other or how they will never leave each other, as such promises would 
be meaningless without the mediation of the big Other. Instead, the words exchanged are 
what will be inscribed into the big Other’s vocabulary, thereby permanently changing the 
subjects’ social status and identity and resulting in an ethical bond between them. Making a 
marriage work, then, is less a matter of disappointing the partner than of disappointing the big 
Other.  
 
Kant’s Marriage as a Contract  
Indeed, if only passionate love between two subjects gives rise to a marriage, then marriage is 
nothing but an external contract. Hegel’s refusal of the idea should not be surprising, as he 
was explicitly working against Kant’s significant formulation marriage as a contract, which 
frames marriage in the same section as contracts that guarantee the possession of things.  
In PR, Hegel more than once explicitly spoke against Kant’s contractual theory of 
marriage: 
Unter den Begriff vom Vertrag kann daher die Ehe nicht subsumiert werden; diese 
Subsumtion ist in ihrer - Schändlichkeit, muß man sagen, bei Kant (»Metaphys. 
Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre«, S. 1 06 ff.) aufgestellt. - Eben sowenig liegt die 
Natur des Staats im Vertragsverhältnisse, ob der Staat als ein Vertrag aller mit allen 
oder als ein Vertrag dieser aller mit dem Fürsten und der Regierung genommen 
werde. (§75)  
Hegel’s criticism of Kant concentrates on Kant’s “simplistic” equation of a marriage and a 
contract. For Hegel, Kant’s account of marriage reduces marriage to a piece of paper in 
which subjects make deals and exchanges with each other. Hegel’s refusal of this idea is not a 
matter of taste or preference; what Hegel opposes is Kant’s attempt to omit the wedding 
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ceremony on which Hegel places great importance. In Kant’s defense, since the nature of 
marriage is based on the contract, there is simply no need for the wedding ceremony, as it 
does not actually confirm or actualize anything or change the status of the subjects involved. 
Before further elaborating on the differences between Kant’s and Hegel’s theories, let us look 
at how the contract itself plays a role in Kant’s moral philosophy.  
Kant believes that a contract gives the subject (i.e., the acceptor) the right to acquire 
something from the other person (MM §20). A contract requires the other person to 
immediately deliver his or her promise and transfer the thing to the subject so that no party 
involved is disadvantaged (ibid. §21). However, once a deal is accepted by both parties, for a 
certain period the acceptor only has a promise from the promisor that latter will perform 
whatever he or she has promised. Only when the thing is delivered does the acceptor no 
longer have a right against the promisor; then, the acceptor acquires a right to the thing. Since 
there is a period of time between promise and acquisition, Kant stressed that in this case, a 
separate contract is required in order to specify the remaining time for which the promisor 
will possess the thing:  
Denn daß dieser eine Sache zum Gebrauche eines anderen auf eigene Gefahr in seine 
Gewahrsame nehmen werde, versteht sich nicht von selbst, sondern dazu gehört ein 
besonderer Vertrag, nach welchem der Veräußerer seiner Sache innerhalb der 
bestimmten Zeit noch immer Eigentümer bleibt (und alle Gefahr, die die Sache treffen 
möchte, tragen muß), der Erwerbende aber nur dann, wann er über diese Zeit zögert, 
von dem Verkäufer dafür angesehen werden kann, als sei sie ihm überliefert. Vor 
diesem Besitzakt ist also alles durch den Vertrag Erworbene nur ein persönliches 
Recht, und der Promissar kann eine äußere Sache nur durch Tradition erwerben. (ibid. 
§21) 
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Turning to how this contract relates to marriage, oddly, Kant himself neglects the connection 
between marriage and contract despite putting them in the same section. Note that Kant 
believes that, through a contract, a subject holds an account for the seller’s performance to 
satisfy the subject with the right they agreed upon in the contract. Kant did not explicitly 
outline how this works in the mechanics of marriage, but he did make a comparison between 
the acquisition of the thing and the acquisition of the person.10 Moreover, as the possession of 
each other’s sexual organ is related to what Kant said, we can assume that the deal between 
the married couple is established in the marriage contract in the following way: the husband 
promises the wife (and vice versa) that she will acquire and possess his sexual organ as long 
as the contract is valid. However, Kant considers that a marriage contract remains a mere 
“simulated contract” [simulierter Vertrag] until “conjugal sexual intercourse” [eheliche 
Beiwohnung (copula carnalis)] takes place (ibid. §27). Furthermore, if the couple did not get 
married, then they would simply treat each other as means to have sex, which violates “pure 
reason’s principles of Right” [Rechtsgesetze der reinen Vernunft] and the principle of 
humanity [Gesetz der Menschheit] (ibid. §24). Hence, the couple signs the contract for 
practical reasons (i.e., in order to have sex with each other). Thus, it is the moral Law that 
makes the couple get married.  
 Kant does not mention the role of the wedding ceremony in actualizing marriages; 
instead, he believes that a marriage is confirmed through a contract and the act of having sex 
based upon the contract. Such an account of marriage gives rise to several areas of ethical 
confusion. First of all, according to Kant, marriage is a form of contract that establishes a 
monogamous union, and what differentiates this union from other relationships and contracts 
 
10 “Der Mann erwirbt ein Weib, das Paar erwirbt Kinder und die Familie Gesinde” (Kant, MM §23). Kant uses the same 
verb, “to acquire” (erwerben), for both the acquisition of the person and the acquisition of the thing, which further proves his 
attempt to draw a connection between the two actions.  
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between people is sex. Then, the purpose of getting married is to enjoy and possess the other 
person’s body. This claim reduces marriage to a purely contractual status, as the only 
difference between marriage and concubinage is a piece of paper (i.e., a contract). 
Furthermore, the omission of the wedding ceremony makes it hard to actually differentiate 
between marriage and concubinage, as in both formats there would be no need to go through 
a symbolic ceremony in which a third party steps in and confirms the union between the two 
subjects. 
However, instead of reading Kant’s account of marriage as something purely 
deductive, another immediate problem, which arises when Kant talks about the scenario that 
the subject’s partner runs away with someone else, should be considered:  
Daß aber dieses persönliche Recht es doch zugleich auf dingliche Art sei, gründet sich 
darauf, weil, wenn eines der Eheleute sich verlaufen, oder sich in eines anderen Besitz 
gegeben hat, das andere es jederzeit und unweigerlich, gleich als eine Sache, in seine 
Gewalt zurückzubringen berechtigt ist. (ibid. §25) 
The problem here is that Kant equates the subjects in marriage to commodities, because the 
subject had the right to request his or her partner’s return as, according to the legal contract, 
he or she possesses the partner’s sexual organ and thereby the entire person (as one’s sexual 
organ is inseparable from personhood). Žižek quickly points out the hidden problem here: the 
only way to enable emancipation of the subject is “to progress to the end of the path of 
commodity, of self-objectivization, of turning oneself into a commodity” (Žižek, Sex and the 
Failed Absolute 204). Hence, in Kant’s contractual marriage one’s subjectivity is simply 
reduced to the level of objectivity; marrying someone means possessing the person as an 
object. Moreover, since Kant does not attempt to argue that the relationship between a 
wedded couple is maintained through passionate love, as the Romantics do, what is the 
purpose of maintaining this relationship? What satisfaction do the subjects gain within the 
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marriage contract? Could there be some cases in which the married couple has no desire for 
each other and is only bonded by a contract? If so, why would they choose to get married at 
all? These questions are difficult to answer as Kant’s contractual marriage allows for the 
decision to dissolve or end a marriage (“to forgo the use of a part”) through a separate 
contract if there is no more sexual enjoyment between the couple (MM §26). Clearly, instead 
of running away from the partner, Kant’s moral subject could have simply requested a 
separation and then legitimately enjoyed another subject’s sexual organ. Kant contradicts 
himself insofar as, although he believes that there is no need to have a third party to be 
involved in the marriage contract, the very fact that he considers the scenario of a wedded 
couple leaving each other instead of properly filing a contract of separation indicates the 
existence of the big Other. Even if they do not necessarily know of the existence of the big 
Other, the mysterious force is nevertheless there. The problem in this case of omitting the 
existence of the big Other is that the married couple would simply claim they cannot divorce 
because the contract prevents them from doing so; in reality, however, it is the couple who is 
fully responsible for their decision and action (Zupančič, Ethics of the Real 58). The fact that 
the subject chooses to cheat instead of signing a contract to legally separate is due to the 
secrete enjoyment he or she feels: “the subject attributes to the Other (to Duty or to the Law) 
the surplus-enjoyment he derives from his actions: ‘I am sorry if my actions hurt you, but I 
only did what the Other wanted me to do, so go and talk to It if you have any objections.’ In 
this case, the subject is hiding behind the law” (ibid.). 
 Indeed, the fundamental principle of Kantian ethics is that the subject makes a duty 
his or her duty. This duty is not created outside of his or her subjectivity; thus, the duty is not 
imposed on the subject by the Law. Therefore, as Alenka Zupančič points out, the only way 
to unmask this kind of hypocrisy, when the subject hides behind the Law, is to ask the 
questions “[w]hat makes you believe this is your duty? Are you ready to answer for your 
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duty?” (ibid.). In this context, it can be seen that, even though the subjects in Kantian 
contractual marriage might claim they have no choice but to cheat on their partner, in reality, 
they have the more ethical choice of confronting the lack of enjoyment in their sexual life and 
thereby legally separating from one another. The fact that Kant talks about how the moral 
subject would call the police and take back the possession of his or her partner’s sexual organ 
is a self-contradiction in terms of a truly moral relationship.  
Nonetheless, Kant’s contractual account of marriage does not lack higher ethical 
concerns: he makes the point that marriage denotes higher ethical duties, such as raising a 
family and children, and, although the distinction turns out to be rather unclear, tries to 
differentiate between marriage and concubinage (MM §23). Why, then, does Hegel still 
speak against Kant’s marriage if the higher ethical needs, which are Hegel’s goal, can still be 
fulfilled? In order to answer this question, a more fundamental level of the problem must be 
considered, namely how Kant and Hegel define the term “contract” differently. Unlike Kant, 
Hegel makes a distinction between marital and non-marital contracts: Hegel believes that 
when two subjects enter a non-marital contract, each retains his or her subjectivity and the 
two remain distinct (PR §73). In contrast, however, a marriage, as opposed to a contractual 
relationship, would not be possible without the dissolution of one’s individuality within the 
union (ibid. §158). Two subjects become One and are no longer independent of one another. 
Marriage transcends and transforms the subject’s self-identification but the contract itself 
does not grant this transformation. In Hegel’s eyes, the subjects in Kantian marriage remain 
two individuals with distinct subjectivity who narcissistically enjoy each other’s sexual 
organs for the sake of gaining enjoyment and hide behind the moral Law. Hence, Hegel aptly 
speaks against Kant and claims that marriage is not a contractual relationship (PR §163).  
The question thus arises of why Žižek says that marriage means the contract of a 
contract for Hegel, a claim which contradicts what Hegel said himself. While two 
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autonomous individuals maintain their freedom and autonomy in a contract, marriage is de 
facto another kind of contract insofar as the subjects constrain themselves for the reason of 
being constrained within the marriage (Žižek, “Hegel on Marriage” 3). Hereby, the 
differences between Hegel and Kant should be quite clear at this point: while Kant could not 
accept contradictions and antinomies in things, he overlooks the fact that these contradictions 
and deadlocks are what constitute things and they are the innermost features of things (Žižek, 
Sex and the Failed Absolute 83). Kant believes that the emergence of contradictions is a 
purely subjective process that causes contradictions as such. However, Kant’s obsession with 
the “pure” characterization of things resulted in further contradictions and reversals (as the 
subject’s relation to the big Other illustrates). Hegel, on the other hand, believes that 
contradictions and deadlocks are what drive subjects to enter a marriage union and make 
things ethical.  
 
Kant and the Dialectic of Desire 
The question remains of what role the big Other plays in Kant’s contractual marriage. The 
role played is not as apparent as in Hegel’s account, and, since Lacan says, “man’s desire is 
the desire of the Other” (Seminar XI 38), it is helpful to bring in the Lacanian dialectic of the 
drive and desire to answer the question with clarity.  
In Less than Nothing, Žižek puts forward a useful homology between Kant and Hegel. 
He claims that the shift from Kant to Hegel corresponds to the shift from desire to drive 
(496). In short, the Kantian account of marriage represents desire because it is structured 
around lack and the inaccessible Thing-in-itself. Unlike Kant’s, the Hegelian account of 
marriage exemplifies drive, which achieves satisfaction in the “repeated failure to reach the 
object, in repeated circling around the object” (ibid.). 
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 The dialectic of desire is captured in Kant’s moral dilemma within a contract between 
the action of promising and fulfilling the promise. For Kant, the only way to ensure the 
absolute fairness of a contract is to make and fulfill the promise simultaneously. However, as 
Kant himself quickly points out, there is no possible way to reach a synchronous and 
simultaneous point to enact the contract:  
Aber weder durch den besonderen Willen des Promittenten, noch den des Promissars 
(als Akzeptanten), geht das Seine des ersteren zu dem letzteren über, sondern nur 
durch den vereinigten Willen beider, mithin so fern beider Wille zugleich deklariert 
wird. Nun ist dies aber durch empirische Actus der Deklaration, die einander 
notwendig in der Zeit folgen müssen, und niemals zugleich sind, unmöglich. Denn, 
wenn ich versprochen habe und der andere nun akzeptieren will, so kann ich während 
der Zwischenzeit (so kurz sie auch sein mag) es mich gereuen lassen, weil ich vor der 
Akzeptation noch frei bin; so wie anderseits der Akzeptant, eben darum, an seine auf 
das Versprechen folgende Gegenerklärung auch sich nicht für gebunden halten darf. – 
Die äußern Förmlichkeiten (solennia) bei Schließung des Vertrags (der Handschlag, 
oder die Zerbrechung eines von beiden Personen angefaßten Strohhalms (stipula)), 
und alle hin und her geschehene Bestätigungen seiner vorherigen Erklärung beweisen 
vielmehr die Verlegenheit der Paziszenten, wie und auf welche Art sie die immer nur 
aufeinander folgenden Erklärungen als in einem Augenblicke zugleich existierend 
vorstellig machen wollen, was ihnen doch nicht gelingt; weil es immer nur in der Zeit 
einander folgende Actus sind, wo, wenn der eine Akt ist, der andere entweder noch 
nicht, oder nicht mehr ist. (MM §19) 
Indeed, perfect simultaneity and synchronicity are simply impossible insofar as there is 
always-already a delay between the moment of one subject making a promise and the other 
subject actually possessing the promised thing. Kant’s demand for the impossibility of 
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morality is what Lacan calls the topology of desire: “Kant discovered the essential dimension 
of ethics: the dimension of desire, which circles around the real qua impossible” (Zupančič, 
Ethics of the Real 3). This impossibility of perfect reciprocity is far from being an unfortunate 
byproduct of the external ceremony whereby the actual exchange (of each other’s sexual 
organ) has to be delayed. Rather, the impracticability is part of the contract par excellence. 
This unattainability of the moral Law, this void, signals that “the moral subject is fully 
responsible for the translation of the categorical imperative into a concrete moral obligation” 
(Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder 169). Moreover, far from calling out this moral dilemma 
that resides within the nature of the Law, Kant’s moral subjects take great pleasure in trying 
to reach the impossible perfect reciprocity, making the desire Thing-in-itself. Therefore, as a 
consequence of situating desire in Kant’s moral Law, the subject’s relation to the Law is 
ambiguous: it is not the case that the subjects strive to behave perfectly morally, and yet the 
Law prevents them from achieving absolute morality. This ambiguous prohibition is 
connected to one’s subjectivity—specifically, to one’s status as a desiring subject of the big 
Other.  
 Yet Kant’s subjects are not perverse in the sense that the subjects chase the Law to an 
endless chain because they know that it is unattainable. This interpretation would presuppose 
that the desire is the subject’s desire. What Lacan means by the dictum “man’s desire is the 
desire of the Other” is that the desire of the subject is essentially the desire for recognition by 
the big Other (Seminar XI 38). We desire things that the big Other desires, or what we think 
the big Other desires, because we never truly know what the big Other desires. That is why 
we want to make an appearance in front of the big Other in order to seek Its approval.  
 The desire for the big Other, according to Žižek, should be read as both “genitivus 
subjectivus” and “genitivus objectivus” (The Indivisible Remainder 167). What the subject 
desires is essentially a recognized object of the other and the subject’s desire is constituted 
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through the big Other (ibid.). Lacan says that “the desire for recognition dominates the desire 
that is to be recognized, preserving it as such until it is recognized” (“The Freudian Thing” 
Écrit 359). The big Other’s desire remains impossible insofar as the enigma of such desire 
resides precisely within its “impenetrability” (Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder 168). The 
encounter with the big Other is never clear; even if the subject succeeds in constructing his or 
her own desire, there is always a gap between what the subject desires and what the subject 
actually wants. The perfect synchronicity of desiring the same thing at the same time will 
never occur:  
It should be noted that a clue may be found in the clear alienation that leaves it up to 
the subject to butt up against the question of his essence, in that he may not 
misrecognize that what he desires presents itself to him as what he does not want—a 
form assumed by negation in which misrecognition is inserted in a very odd way, the 
misrecognition, of which he himself is unaware, by which he transfers the 
permanence of his desire to an ego that is nevertheless obviously intermittent, and 
inversely, protects himself from his desire by attributing to it these very 
intermittences. (Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire” 
Écrits 690–691) 
Lacan’s critique and appreciation of Kant lie in the fact that Kant’s moral philosophy opened 
a new vein that asks us to follow the principle that it is impossible (Seminar VII 315). For 
Lacan, Kant introduced the dimension of desire into ethics. However, according to Lacan, a 
further critical step is necessary to complement the Kantian ethics: the transformation of the 
dialectic of desire into the dialectic of the drive:  
You love mutton stew. You’re not sure you desire it. Take the experience of the 
beautiful butcher’s wife. She loves caviar, but she doesn’t want any. That’s why she 
desires it. You see, the object of desire is the cause of the desire, and this object that is 
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the cause of desire is the object of the drive—that is to say, the object around which 
the drive turns. (Seminar XI 243) 
What Lacan means essentially, is that the object a, as object-cause of desire, is the object of 
the drive. In order to better grasp the concept between drive and desire, it is useful to consider 
a simple and well-known story, “Snow White” [“Schneewittchen”], to make the case that, in 
contrast to the subjectivity of desire, drive is non-subjectivized and gives rise to enjoyment 
that occupies a privileged position above one’s subjectivity.  
 
Desire vs. Drive  
In the well-known fairy tale “Snow White,” the evil queen dies because she cannot stop 
dancing in a pair of red shoes: “[D]a waren eiserne Pantoffeln im Feuer glühend gemacht, die 
mußte sie anziehen und darin tanzen, und ihre Füße wurden jämmerlich verbrannt, und sie 
durfte nicht aufhören bis sie sich zu todt getanzt hatte” (Grimm 249–250). Dancing to death 
is, perhaps, most commonly viewed as her punishment. Yet in psychoanalysis, those red 
shoes stand for nothing but drive in its purest form: the red shoes are an undead partial object 
that illustrates the non-subjectivized drive, or, to put it plainly, “what the shoes want.” This 
drive here is particular because it is sadomasochistic, meaning that the pain transforms into 
the subject of the drive. Even more extremely, only when the subject makes his or her life 
come to an end can the drive be terminated (Lacan, Seminar XI 183). It is through 
(compulsive) repetition [Wiederholungszwang] or repeated movement that this drive 
continues, regardless of the price to be paid. 
  Positing the question and listening to this compliment is never enough, since the 
queen does so repeatedly and, finally, realizes there is more enjoyment behind as such. 
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Indeed, it is a pleasure for the queen to hear from the mirror that she is the most beautiful 
person, yet she eventually realizes that there is a jouissance beyond the pleasure principle. 
This drive is non-subjectivized and it brings the subject an enjoyment or pleasure; 
albeit sometimes the subject does not enjoy it, there is nothing he or she can do to prevent it 
from occurring in a repetitive pattern. The queen does not know what her real drive is, but the 
red shoes keep reminding her: this is what we (the shoes) want. However, she can never 
subjectivize this drive as part of her, because it is something of “her own” but also something 
“above her.” 
 
Hegel’s Arranged Marriage and Drive  
The dialectic of the drive is well reflected in Hegel’s ethical love. The “above the subject” of 
the drive precisely and faithfully represents Hegel’s contingent partner. The fact that a 
wedded couple surrender themselves to the marriage does not necessarily mean that they are 
more in love with each other. However, the drive makes them commit to each other even if 
there is no passionate attraction or obsession. In other words, the satisfaction that Hegelian 
subjects gain from marriage is refreshed over and over again without the partners trying to 
love each other more and more each time. Unlike in Kant’s theory, the enjoyment that 
Hegelian subjects gain from repetition is not through perfect reciprocity, as it is impossible 
for the desire ever to be satisfied. Instead, a different kind of enjoyment first happens at the 
moment of the wedding ceremony. Kant requires a perfectly synchronous wedding ceremony 
that is impossible to achieve; the ethical core of Kant corresponds to the dialectic of desire, 
which is grounded in its “constitutive lack” (Žižek, Less than Nothing 496). In contrast, 
Hegel’s ethical subjects go through one additional process of exchanging vows promising 
something that they already know (that, as married couples, they should love each other). 
Moreover, it does not matter if the couple does not have the most passionate love for each 
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other, as this repetition will nevertheless give rise to “self-conscious love” [selbstbewußte 
Liebe] (Hegel, PR §161).11 At its most extreme, Hegel argues that the true ethical form of 
marriage is arranged marriage:  
Die objektive Bestimmung, somit die sittliche Pflicht, ist, in den Stand der Ehe zu 
treten. Wie der äußerliche Ausgangspunkt beschaffen ist, ist seiner Natur nach 
zufällig und hängt insbesondere von der Bildung der Reflexion ab. Die Extreme hierin 
sind das eine, daß die Veranstaltung der wohlgesinnten Eltern den Anfang macht und 
in den zur Vereinigung der Liebe füreinander bestimmt werden den Personen hieraus, 
daß sie sich, als hierzu bestimmt, bekannt werden, die Neigung entsteht, - das andere, 
daß die Neigung in den Personen, als in diesen unendlich partikularisierten, zuerst 
erscheint. - Jenes Extrem oder überhaupt der Weg, worin der Entschluß zur 
Verehelichung den Anfang macht und die Neigung zur Folge hat, so daß bei der 
wirklichen Verheiratung nun beides vereinigt ist, kann selbst als der sittlichere Weg 
angesehen werden. (ibid. §162) 
As the passage above shows, for Hegel, what brings the couple together is not passionate love 
per se; rather, the act of repeating these words at a wedding ceremony makes the partner 
committed to the union regardless. The “self-conscious love” is thus not consciously felt in 
terms of one’s feeling [Empfindung]; instead, the subject should be aware of his or her ethical 
duty and the surrender of his or her subjectivity. Therefore, even if the couple has never met 
or gone on dates to get to know each other and fall in love, the moment that they decide to get 
married nonetheless gives rise to the mutual inclination. To use Žižek’s words, this kind of 
marriage is defined as follows:  
[A] drive does not bring satisfaction because its object is a stand-in for the Thing, but 
because a drive, as it were, turns failure into triumph—in it, the very failure to reach 
 
11 The relation between repetition and drive is further discussed in Chapter three.  
 37 
its goal, the repetition of this failure, the endless circulation around the object, 
generates a satisfaction of its own. (Less than Nothing 498) 
To this end, the realm of the drive explains why Hegel believes that the “transient, capricious, 
and purely subjective aspects of love” [das Vergängliche, Launenhafte und bloß Subjektive] 
should be excluded from marriage (PR §161).  
 It is nevertheless crucial to keep in mind that Hegel does not say that marriage for 
love is not allowed or that it directly contradicts “ethico-legal love” [rechtlich sittliche Liebe], 
as he does acknowledge the ethicality of those who fall in love first and then get married. 
Hegel continues:  
In dem andern Extrem ist es die unendlich besondere Eigentümlichkeit, welche ihre 
Prätentionen geltend macht und mit dem subjektiven Prinzip der modernen Welt (s. 
oben §124 Anm.) zusammenhängt. - In den modernen Dramen und anderen 
Kunstdarstellungen aber, wo die Geschlechterliebe das Grundinteresse ausmacht, wird 
das Element von durchdringender Frostigkeit, das darin angetroffen wird, in die Hitze 
der dargestellten Leidenschaft durch die damit verknüpfte gänzliche Zufälligkeit, 
dadurch nämlich gebracht, daß das ganze Interesse als nur auf diesen beruhend 
vorgestellt wird, was wohl für diese von unendlicher Wichtigkeit sein kann, aber es 
an sich nicht ist. (PR §162) 
What Hegel argues is that subjective love and feeling should not be the fundamental basis of 
an ethical union. What makes marriage for passionate love “problematic” for him is that it is 
more difficult to test or prove that the reason the subjects are getting married is not primarily 




To conclude, Hegel’s ethical love is dependent on the action of subjects voluntarily giving up 
their self-autonomy and establishing an ethical union. This ethical union is only ethical if the 
big Other, the higher authority, openly confirms it during the wedding ceremony. Kant’s 
contractual marriage, on the other hand, attempts to omit the big Other but only results in its 
further fetishism as the subjects become the desiring subjects of the big Other. Hegel’s and 
Kant’s accounts of marriage essentially represent their distinct conceptions of ethicality 
[Sittlichkeit] and morality [Moralität]: Hegel’s ethical life is independent of “moral norms, 
laws, ideals, principles, or ends” (Bernstein 394). Unlike that of Hegel, Kant’s morality of 
marriage attempts to disavow the intervention and mediation of the big Other and the self-
contradiction in the mechanics of marriage-in-itself. Therefore, it allows the subjects to hide 
behind the moral Law, making the claim that it is the Law that requires them to behave in a 
pathological manner. Although I have tried to argue that Kant’s morality resembles the 
Lacanian concept of desire and Hegel’s ethicality corresponds to drive, I do not intend to 
argue that drive can simply replace the logic of desire; instead, drive is the point that one 
reaches only when one “pass[es] through desire and insist[s] on it until the very end” 
(Zupančič, Ethics of the Real 239). The Hegelian ethical subject “has traversed” the 
fundamental fantasy, which is situated within the realm of desire. The Hegelian subject, even 
if he or she does not end up being together with the idealized partner, is perfectly aware of 
the fact that he or she must surrender his or her autonomy but nevertheless decides to love the 







Chapter 2 The Debate on Freedom and Subjectivity: J. G. Fichte’s 
Metaphysics of Love 
In PR, Hegel openly criticizes his Romantic contemporaries and their conceptualization of 
love; above all, he targets Friedrich Schlegel’s Lucinde: 
Daß die Zeremonie der Schließung der Ehe überflüssig und eine Formalität sei, die 
weggelassen werden könnte, weil die Liebe das Substantielle ist und sogar durch diese 
Feierlichkeit an Wert verliert, ist von Friedrich v. Schlegel in der Lucinde und von einem 
Nachtreter desselben in den Briefen eines Ungenannten (Lübeck und Leipzig 1800) 
aufgestellt worden. (§164) 
For Hegel, Romantic love is not “ethico-legal” [rechtlich sittliche] love but rather “passion” 
[Leidenschaft] or “liveliness” [Lebendigkeit]. One of the main reasons why Hegel poses such 
a strong criticism is that the Romantics attempt to neglect the importance of the wedding 
ceremony. Furthermore, Hegel considers Romantic love as an obsessive internalization of the 
self and genuinely ethical love as created precisely by external elements (e.g., speech act, 
vows) at a symbolic ceremony. Although Hegel directly addresses Schlegel and his Lucinde 
in PR, it is not surprising that he also directs his criticism against Fichte, whose philosophical 
system provides a critical foundation for the Romantics, especially on the conception of love 
its relation to subjectivity.  
In his book Uncivil Unions, Adrian Daub uses the term “Fichtean moment” to 
highlight Fichte’s influence on thinkers who came after him (36). Many German Romantic 
and Idealist thinkers either studied with Fichte directly or learned about him indirectly. 
Indeed, Fichte’s philosophy marks the intersection of German Idealism and Romanticism and 
provides the critical vocabulary for the Romantic ideal of love and marriage. Žižek argues that 
the history of German Idealism should be read as to how each “predecessor” overcomes his 
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“successor” in the progressive line of “Kant-Fichte-Schelling-Hegel-late Schelling” (Less 
than Nothing 137). Therefore, the reading of Fichte proposed in this thesis is important for 
this thesis since he does not only play a crucial role in terms of being a successor of 
Immanuel Kant and his moral and political philosophy but also lays a critical foundation for 
both later German Idealism represented by Hegel and Schelling, and Romanticism in 
different aspects.12 
 For this purpose, it is inevitable to discuss Fichte’s system of love and marriage 
contained in the first appendix (hereinafter, FA) of the Foundations of Nature Right: 
According to the Principles of Wissenschaftslehre [Grundlage des Naturrechts nach 
Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre]. This work appeared in 1796–1797—approximately the 
same year as Kant’s MM, published in 1797. It is unlikely that the two philosophers were 
familiar with each other’s ideas and arguments when they wrote their respective works: 
therefore, Fichte’s account of marriage cannot be considered a direct correspondence to 
Kant’s MM. However, a crucial aspect of Fichte’s philosophical enterprise is to reconstitute 
Kant’s moral philosophy foundations. Hegel’s PR was published 20 years after MM and FA, 
and both Kant’s and Fichte’s works were on the reading list for the young Hegel.13 Hence, the 
main goal of this chapter is to investigate Fichte’s deductive account of marriage through a 
psychoanalytic lens and assess how it differentiates from Kant’s and Hegel’s theories. In 
doing so, I draw attention to the question of subjectivization and sexuation and argue that 
 
12 It is fair to say that German Idealism provides a critical ideological basis for German Romanticism. Friedrich Schlegel 
explicitly acknowledged Fichte’s influence on his work: “Die Französische Revolution, Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre, und 
Goethes Meister sind die größten Tendenzen des Zeitalters” (Schlegel A[216]). The idea of free spirit is an important theme 
in German Idealism and one of Fichte’s main contributions. 
13 See “Hegel’s ‘theological period’: a reactionary legend” and “Hegel’s role in Schelling’ break-away from Fichte” in 
Georg Lukács’ The Young Hegel. 
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Fichte’s attempt to construct a dual relationship without the mediation of a third element 
reflects the pursuit of self-consciousness and individual freedom in his overall philosophical 
system. The main points discussed in this chapter include, first, Fichte’s failure to provide a 
satisfying reason for the necessity of the public recognition of the marriage union. Second, I 
use psychoanalysis as a tool to prove that Fichte’s sexuation should not be read as a 
biological or sociological gender construction of man and woman as two opposite parties 
forming a totality, as already indicated in existing literature (e.g., Daub 2015; Bisol 2017). In 
my interpretation, Fichte’s division of masculinity and femininity does not pinpoint the 
difference of biological sex or sociological construction of gender but rather two different 
kinds of sexual desire that thrives for two different kinds of jouissance in Lacanian terms. As 
a result, I argue that Fichte’s sexuation coincides with Lacanian sexuation, whereby the 
woman is the subject of the unconscious who gains its subjectivity by surrendering its 
individual freedom and identity, thus becoming a part of the big Other.14 
 
Marriage and Love in Fichte 
 
14 Yolanda Estes argues that Fichte’s sexual difference is an expression of two different desires. However, the purpose of 
Estes’ argument is to prove that sexuality is fluid across all sexes and gendering indexes, whereby a fluid gender role that 
corresponds to the one defined by contemporary ideology can be established in Fichte’s work. It is not my intention to use 
the contemporary ideological belief to justify Fichte’s philosophy. The one reason why sexuation is crucial to Fichte’s 
account of marriage is outlined by Fichte himself instead: “Eine Verbindung, wie die beschriebene, heißt eine Ehe. Die Ehe 
ist eine durch den Geschlechtstrieb begründete vollkommene Vereinigung zweier Personen beiderlei Geschlechts, die ihr 
eigner Zweck ist. Sie ist durch den Geschlechtstrieb in beiden Geschlechtern begründet, für den forschenden Philosophen” 
(FA §8). Therefore, in order to be faithful to Fichte’s philosophical system, one should neither provide a positivist reading of 




Before discussing the role of the wedding ceremony in Fichte’s approach to marriage and 
how it differs from Hegel’s, it is useful to preliminarily consider the general structure of the 
appendix and highlight some key points. The structure of the appendix is itself a crucial hint 
at its difference from Hegel’s PR. In this appendix, Fichte outlines the conception of love 
before discussing marriage. The concept of marriage is not mentioned until the eighth 
paragraph, suggesting that Fichte considers love as a prerequisite of a marriage rather than its 
byproduct. Unlike Kant, Fichte’s marriage is not dependent upon a contract to resolve the 
dignity problem: marriage is autonomous from juridical reasons, and sexuality within a 
loving disposition automatically gives rise to it (FA Remark, §8). As David Archard points 
out, the Fichtean union is a union “for its own sake and for ever” (191). Fichte seems to 
distinguish between a perfect union deriving from love and matrimony imposed by the state 
(ibid.). Specifically, he defines marriage as follows: “Die Ehe ist eine durch den 
Geschlechtstrieb begründete vollkommene Vereinigung zweier Personen beiderlei 
Geschlechts, die ihr eigner Zweck ist” (FA §8). Therefore, a preliminary conclusion is that 
Fichte’s deductive account of marriage emphasizes the underlying sensual feeling between 
two free subjects that are independent of any bureaucratic authority.  
As for the role of the state, Fichte believes that the state must watch over the 
reciprocal relationship between two parties who enter a marriage union. Marriage is not only 
a moral but also a spiritual union that makes two subjects become one soul (ibid. §15). For 
example, a divorce does not take place when the married couple goes to court because in this 
case, the marriage union would have been juridical. Moreover, Fichte argues that if two 
subjects actually love each other and therefore become one unified totality, it is not possible 
for them to go to court since one cannot take oneself to court (ibid.). Thereby, Fichte rejected 
the juridical verification of a divorce, claiming that a divorce automatically occurs at the 
moment when two subjects no longer feel that they belong to the same soul, because only 
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when two subjects are no longer an entirety, they can go to court on their own behalf. The 
juridical process is thus only a formal procedure of the state to confirm the couple’s 
separation, but the actual separation already happens at the very moment in which mutual 
love no longer exists.  
On the other hand, Fichte claims that love is not enough to give rise to marriage since 
the latter is only truly consummated when sexual intercourse has occurred within the married 
couples (ibid. §14). More radically, Fichte posits that whoever has had intercourse is 
considered married (ibid.). Here, the essential similarity between Fichte and Kant can be 
spotted in both of them considering the need for something external to justify sexual behavior 
to preserve humanity or dignity. The solution that Kant comes up with is the contractual 
marriage, in which Kant believes a married couple rightfully possesses each other’s sexual 
organ (MM §25). Fichte’s answer to this is love because he believed that as long as two 
partners love each other, the dignity [Würde] that is threatened by sex is protected by the 
form of love (FA §4).15  
As discussed in the first chapter, Kant’s moral subjects obsessively pursue 
subjectivity because Kant believes that sex out of a contract reduces a person’s humanity. 
However, the paradox and flaw in Kant’s theory are that the pursuit of subjectivity results in 
reducing each subject into a kind of sexual object possessed by the other being. In a similar 
vein, Fichte also emphasizes the sexual role in his deduction of marriage, but the role 
accounts for a different purpose. While Kant’s theory of marriage is established within a 
moral framework and the subjects get married for the sake of the approval of the moral Law, 
it is not clear how the subject chooses his or her sexual partner. Whom the subject has sex 
with seems irrelevant to Kant as long as sexual intercourse is legitimized by contract. In 
extreme cases, the contract would be used as a tool for the subject to protect his or her 
 
15 Fichte exclusively refers to feminine dignity, which is further discussed in the section on sexual difference.  
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humanity when he or she accidentally had sex with a stranger. Fichte, on the other hand, 
insists that there has to be a loving disposition or relationship established before the 
consummation of sex in order to protect one’s dignity. Therefore, Fichtean consummation of 
sex cannot be as accidental as portrayed in Kant’s contractual marriage.  
 
Fichte’s Wedding Ceremony  
Hegel does not place importance on the consummation of sex since he believes that sexual 
intercourse must occur after the decision to get married. The difference at stake is that there 
needs to be a preestablished fantasy frame for the Hegelian subjects before having sex instead 
of a direct sexual relationship with each other. What both Hegel and Fichte discuss in their 
works is the role of the wedding ceremony.  
What differentiates Fichte from Hegel is that, for Hegel, the wedding ceremony 
counts more than the subjects’ inclinations; in other words, love is a decision insofar as the 
subjects first decide to love each other, and then the loving disposition arises. Conversely, 
Fichte believes that the wedding ceremony is only a formal confirmation of the inclinations 
of the two loving subjects. The passage where Fichte discusses the role of the wedding 
ceremony should be quoted in length in preparation for further analysis:  
Jede Ehe muß juridische Gültigkeit haben, d. h. das Menschenrecht des Weibes muß 
nicht verletzt sein; sie muß sich mit freiem Willen, aus Liebe, und nicht gezwungen, 
gegeben haben. Jeder Bürger muß gehalten sein, dies vor dem Staate zu erweisen; 
widrigenfalls der Staat das Recht haben würde den Verdacht der Gewalttätigkeit auf 
ihn zu werfen, und gegen ihn zu untersuchen. Aber er kann diesen Beweis nicht 
füglich anders führen, als dadurch, daß er die Frau ihre freie Einwilligung gerichtlich 
erklären läßt, bei der Trauung. Das Ja der Braut sagt eigentlich weiter nichts, als daß 
sie nicht gezwungen sei. Alles übrige, wozu die Ehe verbindet, versteht sich daraus 
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von selbst, daß sie eine Ehe schließen. Was das Ja des Mannes bedeuten könne, wird 
sich tiefer unten zeigen. Daß er nicht gezwungen sei, geht daraus hervor, daß er ja die 
Frau zur Trauung führt. - Daß die Ehe, da sie etwas auf Moralität Gegründetes, und 
schlechthin nur durch sie Bestehendes ist, unter den Augen derer, die die Erzieher des 
Volks zur Moralität sein sollen, d. i. der Geistlichen, geschlossen wird, ist sehr 
vernünftig. (FA §14) 
From the passage above, it can be inferred that Fichte believes that language is external to a 
marriage union, as the vows that are exchanged between two subjects do not enact or confirm 
it. This is especially true considering that the Fichtean wedding ceremony is a formal 
juridical process aimed at ensuring that nobody is coerced into the union. The Fichtean 
wedding ceremony is different from the Hegelian one because Hegel believes that language is 
internal to love and radically shifts the subjects’ social position before and after the symbolic 
ceremony. Hence, for Hegel, the wedding ceremony is symbolic, whereas it is formal and 
juridical for Fichte.  
Moreover, Fichte quickly points out that the state or the clergy has no right to refute 
two subjects who want to marry if they are connected and inclined to get married (ibid.). As 
Fichte believes, only nature and reason can prohibit an inappropriate marriage, and if a 
marriage is prohibited by nature and reason, there is simply no need for any state authority to 
do anything to prevent the marriage from happening (ibid.). To that end, both Hegel and 
Fichte come from the same direction insofar as they both recognize the significance of public 
recognition of the marriage; however, they end up drawing remarkably different conclusions. 
In Hegel’s account of marriage, the ethical core is established qua the wedding ceremony, 
meaning that the two subjects commit to each other through exchanging spoken vows at the 
symbolic ceremony. The formality passes over to become a necessity that confirms the 
legitimacy of the union. In Fichte’s marriage system, the wedding ceremony comes after two 
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subjects’ commitment to each other: therefore, the wedding ceremony is qua love. For Fichte, 
the role of the clergy at the wedding ceremony is thus not the big Other because the clergy 
does nothing that actually affects the subjects’ inclination but only openly verifies the 
marriage’s morality (i.e., that no one is coerced into the union). The clergyman, although 
appearing to be the one who actualizes the marriage during the wedding ceremony, only 
confirms the union pro forma. He is not the self-imposed big Other of the subjects through 
whom the wedded couple decides to commit to each other and who is continuously part of the 
couple’s married life. Hence, the clergy is irrelevant to aspects other than the juridical ones in 
the couple’s life and therefore does not play any further role in their marriage disposition. 
Therefore, it should not be surprising that the Romantics influenced by Fichte are convinced 
that the wedding ceremony is a purely external bureaucratic formality that can be fully 
omitted.  
Along these lines, Fichte is comparable to Kant in terms of attempting to dismiss the 
role of the big Other. However, unlike Kant’s moral subjects who intend to omit the big 
Other but end up fetishizing it further and hiding behind the moral Law, Fichte believes that 
forming a union is the consequence of a straightforwardly dual relationship that does not 
require a third party for mediation. This difference is crucial because the big Other only exists 
when the subject attempts to address it or, to use Žižek’s words, the existence of the big 
Other depends on the subject’s belief in it (Less than Nothing 92). While Hegel’s big Other is 
external and intentional, the big Other plays an unintentional internal role in Kant’s theory of 
marriage. This argument can be proved by the fact that the big Other in both accounts of 
marriage does more than officially announce the union. While Fichte considers the wedding 
ceremony as nothing but a formal confirmation from the state, this ceremony itself can be 
understood as a discursive element. One may say that the purpose of the wedding ceremony 
is to ensure the moral legitimacy of a marriage, but this argument would hardly make sense 
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here, as Fichte explicitly points out that marriage must arise from love, and nature will 
prohibit marriages that are deemed to be inappropriate: “Sie ist vollkommen bestimmt, sage 
ich, d. h. nur eine solche Ehe, wie die beschriebene, und schlechthin keine andere 
Verbindung beider Geschlechter zur Befriedigung des Geschlechtstriebs, verstatten Natur, 
und Vernunft” (FA §9).16 If there is such coercion, would nature have not already prohibited 
the wedding ceremony from happening in the first place? If not, when exactly will nature and 
reason intervene in inappropriate wishes and attempts to get married? In this sense, Fichte’s 
explanation of the wedding ceremony is confusing since he is not clear enough about the 
purpose behind such a ceremony taking place.  
 As mentioned in the previous section, even though there is no more love between the 
couple, the couple still needs to go to the state to confirm the dissolution of the marriage. 
However, the state or the church does not have the right to change the couple’s decision, as 
they can only inform the couple about moral principles and education. To conclude, Fichte 
attempts to lessen the role of the big Other in a marriage union, entirely and firmly grounds 
the unity or the separation between two subjects on their subjective feelings. Nevertheless, 
the question at stake is whether those feelings are genuinely subjective and autonomous. In 
the following sections, I discuss the problem of subjectivity in Fichte’s philosophical system 
and its relation to objective nature.  
 
 
16 Nature and reason cannot be seen as the big Other insofar as both are purely objective conditions. The big Other, on the 
other hand, is conditioned upon and particularized for each subject. The big Other is not a rule or a law that the subject has 
no choice but to obey. As Lacan tells us:  
Now love itself is related to the questioning of the Other regarding what he can give us and what he can furnish by 
way of an answer. Not that love is identical to each of the demands with which we assail the Other, for love is 
situated in what lies beyond this demand, insofar as the Other can or cannot respond to us as an ultimate presence. 
(Seminar VIII 170) 
 48 
Dual Relationship in Fichte 
I have established that the main reason behind Hegel’s and Fichte’s different positions on the 
wedding ceremony is the necessity of a third element. For Fichte, there is simply no need for 
a third element to mediate in the relationship if two subjects are in love with each other. In 
his deductive account, Fichte considers marriage as automatically established by love; hence, 
a wedding ceremony is purely external and unnecessary since marriage is a dual relationship 
in which the two subjects fall in love with each other and reciprocally express their love and 
affection.  
 At first sight, what Fichte argues does not seem to be any different from Lacan’s and 
Hegel’s claims. For Hegel, love in a marriage is a kind of self-conscious love [selbstbewußte 
Liebe], meaning that thse moment that the two people get married, they know they will love 
the person and that the other person will love him or her back (PR §161). As Lacan 
articulates, “to love is, essentially, to wish to be loved” (Seminar XI 253). Differently put, to 
express one’s love for someone means to receive a reply from the other person to confirm 
that one is reciprocally loved by the beloved. The loving disposition is therefore always-
already narcissistic, as it functions almost like a mirror reflection of the subject expressing 
love to him- or herself. As Bruno Moroncini phrases it, saying “I love you” in a conscious 
loving disposition becomes no different from saying “I love myself” (14).  
 Now, the following questions arise: if two subjects can simply have a perfectly 
reciprocal relationship, why do Hegel and Lacan still insist on the necessity of a third party to 
mediate the relationship? Would this third party not be completely unnecessary and even 
disturbing? Would a reciprocal relationship only between the two subjects concerned be more 
sincere and ethical in its being more straightforward? What are the limitations of a reciprocal 
dual relationship, and why is it impossible in both Hegelian and Lacanian ethics?  
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The answer to these questions is the different standpoints on subjectivity and the 
alienation of the self. Both Hegel and Lacan are aware of the pathology behind love and 
therefore radically reject the idea that love is, or can be, a straightforward dual relationship. A 
relationship, according to Lacan, must be “an identity that is based on an absolute non-
reciprocity” (“Kant with Sade” Écrit 653). The fundamental problem behind this kind of dual 
relationship is not simply narcissism but rather the recognition of the subject. Fichte argues 
that the subject is essentially self-positing, meaning that the constitution of the self is only 
based on the subject’s self-reflexive activities (Foundations §1). For Hegel and Lacan, on the 
other hand, the subject cannot directly perceive his or her selfhood through a mirror 
reflection. The Lacanian subject is divided and alienated from him- or herself, and it is “a 
form of existence of the contradiction, antagonism, at work in the very existence of objects of 
objects” (Zupančič, “Ontology and the Death Drive” Subject Lessons 161). Hence, the 
subject itself is a contradictory concept since the subjectivization comes from objectivation. 
In Lacanian psychoanalysis, no subject can exist independent of an object, which is the objet 
petit a. The subject can only come into being when there is a void to fill.  
Hegelian subjectivization is a process that arises from the substance, whereas the 
substance is retroactively posited and mediated by the subject (Radnik, “Subjectivity in 
Times of (New) Materialisms” Subject Lessons 53).17 Such retroactivity is evident in Hegel’s 
discussion of subject and substance:  
Sie ist dasselbe, was oben das Subjekt genannt worden, welches darin, daß es der 
Bestimmtheit in seinem Elemente Dasein gibt, die abstrakte, d. h. nur überhaupt 
seiende Unmittelbarkeit aufhebt und dadurch die wahrhafte Substanz ist, das Sein 
 
17 The objet petit a is fundamentally missing in Hegel’s philosophy. The existence of objet petit a is intimately linked with 
pure repetition. The excess a is what sets the repetition, makes it impossible to stop, and forever remains stuck in the 
repetition (Žižek, Less than Nothing 500). This repetition retroactively produces something as if for the first time. 
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oder die Unmittelbarkeit, welche nicht die Vermittlung außer ihr hat, sondern diese 
selbst ist. (PS 36) 
What differentiates Hegel and subjective Idealists is thus not the fact that the Hegelian 
dialectic is less subjective, because if the subject perceives him- or herself through the 
mirroring of the objective world, this process is essentially passive. However, Hegel (aligned 
with Lacan) argues that this process of reflection and recognition is active. What enables this 
mediation is the reflecting subject who objectifies him- or herself in the active process of 
recognition and thereby gives rise to the subject’s self-consciousness. Thus, the Hegelian 
subject, like the Lacanian subject, is always-already mediated by the objective substance.  
  
Fichte’s Self 
Before returning to the discussion of Fichte’s deductive account of marriage, it is useful to 
turn to subjective freedom in Fichte’s account of marriage.  
In his book Uncivil Unions, Daub makes an excellent point regarding the dual 
relationship in Fichte: “[o]n Fichte’s account, on the other hand, the loss of dignity requires a 
certain kind of relationship, and it is this relationship, not the people involved in it, that 
creates and solves the problem of dignity” (52). This statement marks a crucial distinction 
between Fichte and Kant because, although Kant’s account on marriage seems to require a 
contract to actualize a marriage, this contract could be seen as a formality for people who 
wish to save their humanity should they accidentally have sex with each other. Kant’s 
contractual marriage lacks both the Hegelian self-conscious love and the Fichtean 
preestablished relationship between the subjects. Fichtean dignity is maintained by subjects 
who have a loving disposition toward each other. Hegel further radicalizes this point by 
arguing that in a truly ethical love, the decision to love another subject comes even before 
establishing a loving disposition. Therefore, the difference between Fichte and Hegel does 
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not lie in the cause but in the consequence of love. For Fichte, the loving disposition is 
determined by two subjects, and the subject’s decision will automatically be the most suitable 
disposition that is permitted by reason and nature: “Liebe ist der innigste Vereinigungspunkt 
der Natur, und der Vernunft; sie ist das einzige Glied, wo die Natur in die Vernunft eingreift; 
sie ist sonach das Vortrefflichste unter allem Natürlichen” (FA §4). However, a contradiction 
resides within Fichte’s system: although Fichte claims that it should be the subject’s absolute 
freedom to choose one’s partner, there is an underlying Absolute that serves as the higher 
entity that judges the subject’s decision. If the subject and his or her self-consciousness is 
indeed the determinator of the objective reality, which includes nature and reason, why would 
an inappropriate union (e.g., one subject is coerced into a marriage union) take place at all? 
Would it not mean that all unions are always-already legitimate? If we look at the following 
paragraph, Fichte does not specify how nature and reason will prevent inappropriate unions 
from happening:  
Die Ehe ist sonach kein erfundener Gebrauch, und keine willkürliche Einrichtung, 
sondern sie ist ein durch Natur, und Vernunft in ihrer Vereinigung notwendig, und 
vollkommen bestimmtes Verhältnis. Sie ist vollkommen bestimmt, sage ich, d. h. nur 
eine solche Ehe, wie die beschriebene, und schlechthin keine andere Verbindung 
beider Geschlechter zur Befriedigung des Geschlechtstriebs, verstatten Natur, und 
Vernunft. (FA §9) 
Fichte’s contradiction is acknowledged and altered in Hegel’s philosophy of love 
when he criticizes the excessive internalization of the self. As a consequence, Hegel 
explicitly points out the importance of a third element, the big Other, being part of the 
wedding ceremony. One may say that Hegel’s love is less subjective in the sense that there is 
a third party to mediate the wedding ceremony and the married life that comes afterward. 
However, what is radical about Hegel’s position is a reversed contradiction in comparison to 
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Fichte. Fichte’s contradiction lies in the fact that although he claims that only the subject 
makes purely free decisions, the subject has to be reflexive of the objective reality insofar as 
Fichte regards the objective condition (i.e., the Absolute) as a pure appearance that can be 
deduced. This is what Žižek calls the “objective irony” in Fichte’s subjectivity: “[t]herein 
resides the objective irony of Fichte’s development: Fichte, the philosopher of subjective 
self-positing, ends up reducing subjectivity to a mere appearance of an immovable absolute 
In-itself” (Less than Nothing 144). Subjective decision and reflection are therefore passive.   
Hegel reverses the Fichtean contradiction because although there appears to be a third 
party meddling in the union, this third party reflects the subjectivity; therefore, the Hegelian 
subjects are the ones who actually achieve the autonomous love. As Žižek points out, the 
difference between Hegelianism, subjective Idealism (Fichte), and objective Idealism 
(Schelling) is that unlike the latter two forms of Idealism, Hegel’s point is that subjectivity is 
“re-inscribed into objectivity” but not simply deduced as a part of objectivity (ibid.). In other 
words, Fichtean freedom is deductive, as the subject’s choice is in agreement with the order 
of nature and reason and therefore part of the objective reality. For Hegel, subjectivity is not a 
simple reflection of the objective nature; on the contrary, its expression reconstitutes the 
objective reality. Nevertheless, the concurrence of subjectivity and objectivity does not occur 
through a third element that is completely external to the subject because this third element 
(e.g., the big Other) is only possible when the subject believes its existence (ibid. 92). Hence, 
Hegel regards ethical love as a form of self-consciousness. This self-consciousness is not the 
same as the self-consciousness as the one outlined in Fichte and entailing that the subjects try 
to eliminate every external obstacle and use subjective reflection to substitute part of reality. 
It is rather the self-consciousness that is built upon these external obstacles already imprinted 
by subjectivity. Differently put, it is only the subjective condition that can grant the existence 
of the third element. For Hegel, there is no concrete, well-established third element (i.e., 
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nature and reason) that automatically resolves the subjective condition and objective reality 
dilemma. The big Other is only there when the subject recognizes its existence through a 
symbolic ceremony. The big Other is inscribed into the subject’s reality, and once this big 
Other is gone, reality will also disappear. Therefore, the true Hegelian criticism against Fichte 
is not due to Fichte being too subjective but to his failure to formulate the importance of the 
Absolute in constituting self-reflection and self-actualization.  
Thus, the problem that Kant and Fichte share is that both believe that the introduction 
of the big Other as a third element threatens the purity of subjectivity. In MM, the Kantian 
subjects attempt to hide behind the moral Law and claim that immoral behaviors are not the 
subjects’ desire but the desire of the big Other. What the Kantian subjects do not realize is 
that their subjectivity is always-already inscribed in the big Other. The existence of the big 
Other will not transform their subjective reflection, and the subject will not have to become 
the “puppet” of the big Other and do everything that the latter requires because in this case, 
the desire of the subject will not be the desire of the big Other. The desire of the big Other is 
irrelevant to the subject. Conversely, the subject’s desire is reflected in the desire of the big 
Other because the lack in the big Other “opens up the space for the subject to articulate its 
authentic desire” (Žižek, Sex and the Failed Absolute 168). Like Kant, Fichte believes that 
the mediation of the big Other makes the subjectivity less authentic. Both philosophers 
misunderstand the role of the big Other, portraying it as an intruder who disturbs the subject’s 
authentic desire, and both believe that subjectivity has to be a pure thing so that subjective 
desire can represent or replace part of the objective condition. The ultimate lesson from 
Lacan about the big Other is that the latter is the space for the subject to reveal his or her 
subjective desire. The desire of the big Other and the desire of the subject should completely 
coincide. The object or substance is not part of objectivity as a pure appearance but 
something that is actualized by the subject’s self-reflection.  
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The other problem of the Fichtean subject that arises from the omission of the big 
Other is the recognition of the self. What Fichte assumes is that the subject would be able to 
identify him- or herself and his or her partner precisely, which is granted by nature and 
reason because Fichte tries to establish a self-evident certainty in his philosophical system. 
The way alienation works in Fichte’s system is that how I perceive objective conditions is 
always based on my practical purposes at hand (Seidel 102). George Seidel offers an example 
of how alienation works for Fichte: “if my ideal as a health professional is to save lives, then 
I will begin to see in my patients the things I need to be concerned about; I will begin to see 
‘things’ such as high blood pressure, high cholesterol levels, etc.” (ibid.). External or 
objective reality is determined by the subject I. What Fichte believes is, to quote Žižek’s 
words, “the unconditional spontaneity of thinking or the self-activity of the subject” (Sex and 
the Failed Absolute 74). Fichte thinks that self-identification in love is a spontaneous process 
that can be recognized in the Thing-in-itself and therefore does not require anything external 
to mediate. This is different from psychoanalysis because the psychoanalytic subject 
condition is never a direct reflection of objective reality:  
The most elementary form of this gag is, of course, that of delayed self-recognition: I 
pass a glass door and think I see behind it an ugly, disfigured guy; I laugh, and then, 
all of a sudden, realize that the glass was a mirror, and that the figure I saw was 
myself. The Lacanian thesis is that this delay is structural: there is no direct self-
acquaintance; the self is empty. (Žižek, Less than Nothing 145) 
The argument of this quote is that the subject’s self-recognition is always-already mediated 
by a third element. Even since our childhood, we learn how to identify ourselves in the mirror 
reflection so that our alienation is based on the speech and recognition of the parental Other 
(Fink, The Lacanian Subject 36). As subjects, our image of the self is cultivated by a third 
element that stems from the process of subjectivization. Bruce Fink indicates that Lacan 
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describes the subject’s relation to the big Other as an oxymoron— “a forced choice” (ibid. 
50). The paradox of the question of subjectivity resides in a two-sided, contradictory relation: 
on the one hand, it seems that the subject loses his or her subjectivity by accepting the 
surrender of the self to the big Other; yet, on the other hand, submitting to this big Other is a 
necessary condition for the subject to become a subject (ibid.). The Lacanian subject is 
always a split from him- or herself, there is always a fundamental lack in being: “[t]he 
subject’s first guise is this very lack” (ibid. 52). The best Lacanian dictum to summarize the 
relationship between the subject and the big Other is what he repeats again and again in his 
teaching career: “man’s desire is the desire of the Other” (Seminar XI 235). What Lacan does 
not enunciate clearly but one should bear in mind is that the desire of the big Other is not 
different from the desire of the subject: “[f]or man not only desires what the Other desires, 
but he desires it in the same way; in other words, his desire is structured exactly like the 
Other’s. Man learns to desire as an other, as if he were some other person” (Fink, The 
Lacanian Subject 54).  
 In other words, identification of the self can only be produced retroactively 
[nachträglich]. The Lacanian subject at its most fundamental is a void that only what comes 
later can fulfill. Therefore, the recognition of the self is always-already delayed and can only 
be posited retroactively.  
 
Sexual Difference in Fichte  
Apart from the debate on recognition, what makes Fichte interesting in psychoanalysis is the 
framework of sexual difference in his deductive account of marriage. The Hegelian subject is 
not sexed, but the Fichtean and Lacanian subjects are traversed by the sexual difference. By 
saying sexual difference, it is not my purpose to use a postmodern, nonbinary gender theory 
to provide a feminist reading and criticize how Fichte differentiates the role of male and 
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female as sexist. Conversely, sexual difference is Fichte’s alignment with (Lacanian) 
psychoanalysis because the female subject in Fichte’s theory is the subject of the 
unconscious.  
The first and most crucial question before getting into the discussion of sexual 
difference is, what does masculinity or femininity mean in psychoanalysis? Why is it called 
sexual but not gender difference? Or, in other words, why is the subject sexed yet it is not so 
in the same terms as biological sex or sociological gender? Why does psychoanalysis reject 
the idea of a gender-blind society where there is no boundary between males and females? 
Why is there no neutral sex in Lacan’s sexuation?  
 The answer to this question is not sexism or discrimination against one of the sexes 
because, as Žižek points out, the difference between two sexes is not a matter of two opposite 
or contradictory sexes originated from one and split into two —masculinity versus femininity 
(Sex and the Failed Absolute 140). In other words, psychoanalysis does not consider 
masculinity and femininity two radical oppositions that require something in the middle (i.e., 
gender neutrality) to “harmonize” the contradiction and therefore refute sexism. Since the 
prerequisite of sexism is to put masculinity and femininity in competition, the concept of 
sexism is irrelevant to psychoanalytic sexuation. Lacanian sexuation does not refer to a 
biologically or sociologically constructed concept such as gender but to two different 
jouissances that males and females obtain. Therefore, psychoanalysis does not consider the 
one between men and women to be the same kind of opposition as that of black versus white. 
Furthermore, masculinity and femininity do not necessarily correspond to male and female in 
terms of biological sex but to the subject who gets to enjoy the phallic or the Other 
jouissance.  
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The difference between masculinity and femininity is not a matter of one thing split 
into two oppositions. The difference comes from a contradiction that lies within its own:  
The basic division is not [...] that of the One which divides into Two; it’s the division 
of a non-descript thing into One and its rest, excess or surplus. This is how sexual 
difference works: human species does not divide into two (masculine and feminine), it 
divides into One (masculine) and its excess, so it is M+. (Žižek, Sex and the Failed 
Absolute 141) 
This is also why psychoanalysis cannot equate to gender studies; more radically, 
speaking, psychoanalysis is in direct opposition to gender studies. The problem of neo-
feminism and gender studies is that even though they try to deny the biology of sex, the fact 
that they make such an attempt suggests they have already assumed a ready-made, clear-cut 
distinction between two sexes, between masculinity and femininity. Psychoanalysis, on the 
other hand, refutes this clear-cut distinction, and the psychoanalytic gender is not equivalent 
to the division of male and female. Regarding femininity as a surplus of masculinity is not to 
deduce femininity as part of masculinity; rather, it is due to the female is the subject of the 
unconscious who obtains the jouissance of the Other. When Lacan says that “woman does not 
exist,” this claim is not a denial of the existence of female beings (Television 38); what he 
really means is that woman comes into being as a symptom of man (Žižek, The Sublime 
Object of Ideology 79). A man can make a woman come into being through courtly love by 
making her the object of desire, the excess a (Lacan, Television xv). This is further discussed 
in the third chapter.  
 Does it mean that there is only one sex (male) in psychoanalysis and the other sex 
(female) is something extra that adds to the male sex? Reducing sex into one is not what 
occurs in psychoanalysis: as Zupančič explains, if there is only one sex, then this thing would 
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be called NO sex at all (What is Sex 45-46). The fact that this “second sex” is missing does 
not automatically indicate that we only have the “first sex.” Rather, “[w]hat splits into two is 
the very nonexistence of the one (that is, of the one which, if it existed, would be the Other)” 
(ibid. 46). This means that pure masculinity or pure femininity does not exist. The split of 
two sexes does not lead to a symmetrical relationship between the two sexes. This is why 
Lacan says, “the impossibility of establishing as such, anywhere in the enunciable, the sole 
One that interests us, the One of the relation ‘sexual relationship’ (rapport sexuel)” (Seminar 
XX 7). What he means is not that sexual intercourse does not exist. The message behind this 
dictum is two-fold: first, there is no direct, unmediated relationship between the positions of 
masculinity and femininity insofar as the big Other plays a role in the sexual relationship, as 
discussed in the previous sections of this chapter; second, the male and female positions are 
structurally asymmetrical and nonreciprocal.  
 In sum, sexual difference in psychoanalysis is based on neither one’s biological sex 
nor socially constructed gender identity. What differentiates masculinity from femininity is 
the different kinds of jouissance and the subject’s relation to the big Other. While the Other 
jouissance desires what the big Other desires, the phallic jouissance is not related to the big 
Other (Lacan, Seminar XX 9). Sexual difference in Lacan is asymmetrical. As shown in the 
following section, this asymmetrical sexual relation also pertains to Fichte’s theory of 
marriage. 
In Fichte’s system, men and women are represented as entirely active [nur tätig] and 
entirely passive [nur leidend] (FA §2). At first sight, Fichte’s masculinity and femininity 
seem to be closer to the conception of male and female in the stereotypical sense where two 
sexes are opposed to each other. Nonetheless, I argue that what Fichte really means in terms 
of sexual difference should be understood as male and female sexual desire.  
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 In Fichte’s work, love works differently for men and women, as a man cannot fall in 
love with a woman before getting married, yet a woman will have to fall in love with and 
surrender herself to the man before establishing the union. By falling in love with the man, 
the woman loses her autonomy and finds her new identity in love: “Sie behauptet ihre Würde, 
ohnerachtet sie Mittel wird, dadurch, daß sie sich freiwillig, zufolge eines edlen Naturtriebs, 
des der Liebe, zum Mittel macht” (ibid. §4). Here, Fichte’s female love can be juxtaposed to 
Hegelian love because both Fichtean females and Hegelian ethical subjects surrender their 
identity and themselves into the union, and yet they gain their ultimate freedom and 
autonomy through surrender: “Das Weib gibt, indem sie sich zum Mittel der Befriedigung 
des Mannes macht, ihre Persönlichkeit; sie erhält dieselbe, und ihre ganze Würde nur dadurch 
wieder, daß sie es aus Liebe für diesen Einen getan habe” (ibid. §5). The crucial difference 
between Fichte and Hegel is that this formula does not apply to the Fichtean male. While in 
Hegelian ethical love there is no indication of sexual difference in terms of losing one’s 
identity since both men and women go through the same process, it is only women who play 
the role of sacrificing one’s selfhood in Fichte. Yet the difference between men and women 
in Fichte should not simply be read as men being superior to women. On the contrary, Fichte 
hints at a crucial psychoanalytic understanding of sexual difference—namely, that it is only 
through the female gaze that a sexual relationship can take place: “Nur dem Weibe ist die 
Liebe, der edelste aller Naturtriebe, angeboren; nur durch dieses kommt er unter die 
Menschen” (ibid. §4).  
 The woman who loses her identity and selfhood in a loving disposition is the 
psychoanalytic path to become a subject and gain subjectivity, the process of subjectivization. 
The Lacanian subject is not equivalent to an individual in everyday vocabulary or a conscious 
subject in analytic philosophy. This subject is not an active subject that can accurately 
position him- or herself in the world; instead, the subject is formed through the speech 
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addressed to the big Other and corresponds to the big Other’s alienation and desire. This is 
why Lacan concludes: “man’s desire is the desire of the Other” (Seminar XI 235). The person 
who attempts to fulfill his or her own desire is not the Lacanian subject because the desire 
should not be the subject’s desire, but the subject is the desiring subject of the big Other. The 
subject can only identify him- or herself through the recognition from the big Other: “desire 
full stop is always the desire of the Other. Which basically means that we are always asking 
the Other what he desires” (Lacan, My Teaching 38). As already explained in the previous 
section, the paradox here is that psychoanalytic subjectivity is gained in the barred subject of 
the big Other.  
In psychoanalysis, the existence of Man [l’homme] is straightforward and self-
evident; specifically, the masculine structure occurs when the divided, dissatisfied subject 
fails to recognize the desire of the big Other and turns the big Other into the objet petit a. 
However, the existence of Woman [la femme] is more complex because the woman is the big 
Other in the sexual relationship (Lacan, Television 40). What does this mean? Lacan is 
certainly not saying that the woman’s existence can fully replace the role of the big Other 
because, otherwise, there will not be a triad relationship. What Lacan hints at here is that 
when the subject inscribes herself into the big Other, this big Other simultaneously becomes 
what represents the woman’s subjectivity. The contradiction here is that, although a woman 
surrenders her subjectivity for the sake of the big Other, she becomes the subject who enjoys 
the jouissance of the Other, thereby regaining her subjectivity.  
When considering the Lacanian sexuation of the female side, the following two 
claims are present: “[b]eing the Other, in the most radical sense, in the sexual relationship, in 
relation to what can be said of the unconscious, woman is that which has a relationship to that 
Other” (Lacan, Seminar XX 81) and “there is no Other of the Other” (ibid.; Television 40). 
The woman’s relationship to the big Other is different from that of man because the woman’s 
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subjectivity is inscribed in, and gained from, the big Other; hence, the woman will “remain 
forever Other” (Lacan, Seminar XX 81). In a sexual relationship, a woman will be reduced to 
the object of the male fantasy—the objet petit a. (Fink, The Lacanian Subject 117). However, 
this loss of subjectivity signifies that the female subject comes into being because “[t]he very 
adoption of a position or stance with respect to (an experience of) jouissance involves and 
implies subjectivity” (ibid.). Zupančič’s excellent interpretation of these two arguments 
reveals that the major difference between the man and woman is that the woman is the true 
Lacanian subject that situates itself as the desiring subject of the big Other:  
[T]he relationship to the Other is, so to speak, included in the Other; it is “part” of the 
Other. Whereas a man can think of the Other as the exception to the rule, to his rule, 
on the basis of which he relates to women, a woman cannot think of the Other as the 
exception to her rule, but as part of the rule, as included in the rule. This affects 
significantly the nature of this rule, making it “not-all.” The nonexistence of the Other 
is itself inscribed into the Other. (What is Sex 53) 
Thus, the true difference between psychoanalytic masculinity and femininity is the question 
of subjectivization and the different kinds of jouissance that they get to obtain: the male 
enjoys the phallic jouissance and the female enjoys the Other jouissance. The masculine 
position mistakenly believes that an object can fully satisfy a man’s desire and need by 
turning the big Other into the objet petit a, whereas a woman who loves a man will desire to 
fulfill the desire of the Other, which is ultimately the desire of her own. This can be observed 
in what Fichte writes: “[D]iese Liebe ist der Naturtrieb des Weibes, einen Mann zu 
befriedigen. Es ist allerdings ein Trieb, der dringend seine Befriedigung heischt; aber diese 
seine Befriedigung ist nicht die sinnliche Befriedigung des Weibes, sondern die des Mannes” 
(FA §4). The phallic jouissance requires an object and a fantasy frame, meaning that a man 
cannot relate his jouissance to the big Other since his jouissance must be obtained directly 
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from a female object. The Other jouissance, on the other hand, inscribes the jouissance that 
she obtains as part of the satisfaction of the big Other: “[a] man serves here as a relay so that 
a woman becomes this Other to herself, as she is to him” (Lacan, “Guiding Remarks for a 
Convention on Female Sexuality” Écrits 616).  
Returning to Fichte’s homology of the male being entirely active and the female being 
entirely passive, one understands that what Fichte really means is that the man is the subject 
who fantasizes about obtaining direct enjoyment from a passive female object, whereas the 
woman is the subject who gains enjoyment from her own subjectivity.  
This is why, according to Fichte, a woman’s sacrifice for love is ultimately aimed at 
satisfying her own desire:  
Darum ist auch das Weib in der Geschlechtsvereinigung nicht in jedem Sinne Mittel 
für den Zweck des Mannes; sie ist Mittel für ihren Zweck, ihr Herz zu befriedigen; 
und nur, inwiefern von sinnlicher Befriedigung die Rede ist, ist sie es für den Zweck 
des Mannes. (FA §4)  
From a male perspective, the subject believes that he can directly enjoy an object and thus 
treats the woman as a “means” [Mittel] to the enjoyment. On the other hand, femininity 
surrenders herself to the inscription of the big Other through becoming the latter’s desiring 
object. In doing so, the woman gains her identity and subjectivity by learning to desire what 
the big Other desires. The desire of the big Other becomes the desire of the woman; hence, 
the subjectivized woman becomes a part of the big Other. The sexual relationship only works 
when the active man accedes to the passivity, the passive woman, situates her in his fantasy, 
and makes her become the objet petit a.  
To conclude, when Fichte says that woman is purely passive and man is purely active, 
Fichte is really trying to say that woman is “the result of man’s withdrawal into passivity”—
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Returning to Hegel’s criticism of the Romantics, which is also likely a criticism against 
Fichte, one can observe that the main problem behind is the question of subjectivity and 
recognition. Fichte’s problem is not that he is too subjective for Hegel; the paradox is that the 
Fichtean subject deduces his or her subjectivity by behaving in accordance with the Absolute, 
a higher entity that is considered as the objective condition. Fichte’s deduction and failure to 
recognize an object/substance as part of the self leads to the question of whether his subject 
can actually achieve a truly autonomous love. Hegel, on the other hand, reverses Fichte’s 
discourse: although there appears to be a third element mediating Hegelian ethical love, this 
third element acts precisely as the placeholder of the subject’s desire. In this way, the 
Hegelian subject is the one who obtains true autonomy.  
What is included in Fichte’s theory of marriage but not Hegel’s is sexual difference, 
as Fichte differentiates masculinity and femininity as the pursuit of two different kinds of 
desire. Undoubtedly, one cannot assume or claim that Fichte, as Lacan, believes that 
masculinity and femininity do not attribute to biological sexes. However, one should not 
criticize Fichte by using contemporary values and discourses to judge what was considered 
conventional and acceptable at his time. As shown in this chapter, instead of regarding the 
Fichtean male and female as binary concepts, my interpretation offers an alternative reading 
of Fichte’s sexual difference. The Fichtean notion of sexual activity is that the male subject 
actively sets himself to become a passive recipient from the woman object, and the female 
subject gains her new identity and enjoys the Other jouissance through becoming the passive 
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object of the male fantasy. Perhaps, before imposing contemporary feminist ideology on 



















Chapter 3 The Most Sublimated Romantic Love: E. T. A. Hoffmann on 
Romantic contra Ethical Love 
The previous two chapters investigated the conception of love and marriage by Idealists 
including Hegel, Kant, and Fichte, examining the role of the big Other in a loving disposition 
and its relation to the question of subjectivity. Several questions from these chapters remain 
unanswered: for example, what exactly is the relationship between the Hegelian arranged 
marriage and drive? Apart from the problem of subjectivization, what are the other 
differences between Romantic and ethical love? What does transference love have to say 
about subjectivity and objectivity? The best way to answer these questions is through 
examples. In this chapter, I will address these questions by examining a literary case, 
Hoffmann’s The Sandman. The chapter’s focus is the perverse relation to the big Other, 
where the pervert does not seek to gain jouissance by positing himself as the desiring subject 
of the big Other and thereby inscribing his subjectivity into a part of the big Other; rather, the 
pervert has an instrumental relationship with the big Other by making himself the instrument 
of the big Other’s desire in order to avoid a fully sexual relationship.  
To summarize the story briefly: in The Sandman, Hoffmann portrays a “love triangle” 
between Nathanael, Clara, and an automaton, Olimpia. In short, Nathanael is engaged to 
Clara, as is clear from their letter exchanges. What is also evident from the letters exchanged 
between Nathanael, Clara, and Clara’s brother, Lothar is that Nathanael is traumatized by his 
childhood terror of the Sandman, who is said to steal the eyes of children. This childhood 
trauma has given rise to Nathanael’s obsession with eyes. Clara tries to cure him, helping him 
to overcome his inner fear by assuming the role of a “therapist” via her letters. Nevertheless, 
Nathanael does not appear to be “cured” by Clara. One day, Nathanael encounters a beautiful 
automaton through his telescope and falls hopelessly in love with this wooden doll, Olimpia, 
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which has been created by the Doppelgänger of the Sandman. Eventually, this love dissolves 
at the very moment when Olimpia is destroyed, and Nathanael must finally face the reality 
that she is nothing but an automaton.  
Psychoanalysis has its significance in the story. Starting with Sigmund Freud’s essay 
“The Uncanny” [“Das Unheimliche”], The Sandman becomes closely related to 
psychoanalytic concepts—the uncanny, primary narcissism, the Doppelgänger, the sister-
image, and so on. The purpose of this chapter, however, is to focus on the two relationships 
portrayed in the story: namely, the relationship between Nathanael and Olimpia and the 
relationship between Nathanael and Clara. These two contrasting relationships enables the 
construction of a more complete picture of Hoffmann’s depiction of the Hegelian ethical love 
and the rejection of Romantic love. In constructing this picture, it is necessary to introduce 
Lacanian psychoanalytic concepts such as transference, idealization, and sublimation, 
analyzing the emergence and disappearance of the love between Nathanael and Olimpia. A 
simple and yet most difficult question that orients this chapter: how does The Sandman reflect 
different positions of the conception of love that can be situated in German Idealism and 
Romanticism? I work from an account of love based on the theory of transference from 
Freudian lineage to Jacques Lacan’s Seminar VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. I present a 
close reading of transference love and the concepts of Lacanian sublimation and the Thing 
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[das Ding],18 following Lacan and Žižek’s analysis of the courtly love [l’amour courtois] 
tradition of medieval literature.19 
 
Transference and Mistaken Identity 
In order to situate transference love in Hoffmann’s story and thereby investigate the 
emergence of love between Nathanael and Olimpia, it is worth turning to a point made by 
Dolar on the story:  
The mechanical doll only highlights the mechanical character of “intersubjective” 
relations. It is the character exploited by the position of the analyst: the analyst, too, 
utters at the most an “Oh!” here and there (and perhaps a “Good night, love!”); he 
makes himself an automaton in order to give rise to the dimension of the Other, the 
real interlocutor of the patient’s “monologue,” and also in order to produce that 
 
18 Lacan extensively discusses the Thing in Seminar VII, in which he draws attention to the difference between the two terms 
that mean “thing” in German—das Ding and die Sache. In short, Lacan argues that die Sache is the representation of a thing 
in the symbolic order: “the Sache is clearly the thing, a product of industry and of human action as governed by language” 
(Seminar VII 45). Die Sache is opposed to das Ding, as Lacan regards the latter as the thing that “substitutes itself for that 
dumb reality” (ibid. 55). However, Lacan’s definition of das Ding is ambiguous: later in the Seminar, he defines it as an 
unknowable thing and states that it “is impossible for us to imagine it” (ibid. 125). These seemingly contradictory statements 
essentially signify two processes: sublimation and idealization. This is discussed further in the section “Sublimation and the 
Thing” in this chapter. Furthermore, readers should know that the concept das Ding disappears in Lacan’s teaching after 
Seminar VII. In later Seminars, he develops the concept objet petit a to replace das Ding.  
19 Romantic love can be traced back to courtly love, which was a medieval European literary conception of love.  Courtly 
love emerged in early medieval times (11th-century France) and this form of love was not confined to the Middle Ages. 
Although courtly love’s origin and influences continue to be a matter of critical debate and are not a concern of this thesis, 
there is a close connection between courtly love and Romantic love. In Seminar VII, Lacan considers courtly love and 
anamorphosis; what he discusses in particular is Minnesang.  
 68 
strange kind of love, perhaps love in its strictest and purest sense, which is 
transference love. Nathanael’s lengthy conversations with Olympia prefigure the 
analytic session. (Dolar, “Lacan and the Uncanny” 9)  
This passage gives rise to the following questions: what does Dolar mean by transference 
love? How is this artificial, mechanical love produced between Nathanael and Olimpia? 
Since this love can be artificially created, can it also be destroyed?  
The concept of transference love was first introduced by Freud’s essay “Observations 
on Transference Love” [“Bemerkungen über die Übertragungsliebe”] in which Freud 
expresses his surprise at the regularity and predictability of the analysand falling in love with 
the analyst during the analytic session. Freud starts by discussing two possible outcomes of 
the analysand falling in love with the analyst: firstly and rarely, the analyst and analysand are 
mutually in love and enter a permanent legal union; secondly and more commonly, the 
treatment has to be terminated so as not to breach moral and professional standards. 
However, Freud is critical enough to outline the fundamental problem behind the second 
outcome:  
[…] Arzt und Patientin gehen auseinander, nachdem sich die Patientin in den Arzt 
verliebt hat; die Kur wird aufgegeben. Aber der Zustand der Patientin macht bald 
einen zweiten analytischen Versuch bei einem anderen Arzte notwendig; da stellt es 
sich denn ein, daß sich die Patientin auch in diesen zweiten Arzt verliebt fühlt, und 
ebenso, wenn sie wieder abbricht und von neuem anfängt, in den dritten usw. (Zehnter 
Band 308) 
As Freud aptly points out, the nature of transference love means that is not the case that the 
analysand is in love with the analyst per se; instead, the analysand loves the particular role 
that the analyst plays regardless of who he or she actually is. As Fink accurately concludes, 
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transference is a case of “mistaken identity” (Lacan on Love 2). The analyst acts as the 
subject who is supposed to know and who listens to the analysand attentively. Through such 
sessions, the analysand gradually comes to believe that the analyst is someone who holds the 
solution that can cure his or her symptoms and pathological nature (Dolar, A Voice and 
Nothing More 159). As Lacan tells us, transference exists as long as there is a subject who is 
supposed to know (Seminar XI 232). From this perspective, transference means the subject 
attributing his or her knowledge to the big Other (the process of subjectivization). In other 
words, Olimpia is the embodiment of the big Other for Nathanael, and Nathanael attempts to 
express his desire through talking to Olimpia.  
The nature of transference love is the analysand’s resistance to repressed memory, 
and Freud refuses to urge the analysand to suppress, renounce, or sublimate his or her desire 
because otherwise the analytic session would have been futile: “Zur Triebunterdrückung, zum 
Verzicht und zur Sublimierung auffordern, sobald die Patientin ihre Liebesübertragung 
eingestanden hat, hieße nicht analytisch, sondern sinnlos handeln” (Zehnter Band 312). 
Hence, to sum up, transference love is provoked by the analytic situation, intensified by the 
analysand’s resistance, and lacks concerns with reality.  
In The Sandman, Hoffmann hints at the mechanical nature of Olimpia when 
Nathanael first espies her: “starre Olimpia höchst gleichgültig und nur zuweilen sah er 
flüchtig über sein Kompendium herüber nach der schönen Bildsäule, das war alles” (396). 
Indeed, it is strange that Nathanael already knows that Olimpia is nothing more than a 
beautiful statue [die schöne Bildsäule] yet still falls hopelessly in love with her. However, it 
is not simply the case that Nathanael is deceived by Olimpia, as there is no conscious or 
intentional attempt on Olimpia’s side to conceal her mechanical nature. The irony of their 
love lies in the fact that Nathanael already knows he is deceived by his fantasy (considering a 
beautiful statue as a real, lively, and beloved person). And precisely because he knows, he 
 70 
falls into the trap and is willing to be deceived by his fantasy to an even greater extent. In 
other words, it is Nathanael’s resistance and disavowal of reality that gives rise to 
transference love between them. Hoffmann’s “misleading” narration also further suggests 
that the logic of transference is at play: “Erstarrt stand Nathanael - nur zu deutlich hatte er 
gesehen, Olimpias toderbleichtes Wachsgesicht hatte keine Augen, statt ihrer schwarze 
Höhlen; sie war eine leblose Puppe” (407). It is not accurate to conclude that there is a 
sudden realization by Nathanael that Olimpia is an automaton because as a matter of fact, he 
always-already knows it. As the analysand in the analytic context, Nathanael regards Olimpia 
as the only person in the world who truly understands him: “‘O du herrliches, du tiefes 
Gemüt’, rief Nathanael auf seiner Stube: ‘nur von dir, von dir allein wird’ ich ganz 
verstanden’” (Hoffmann 405). Nathanael keeps talking to Olimpia, although the only 
response he receives is “ach, ach.” Olimpia’s minimal use of language evokes the most 
profound and dramatic feeling and gives access to Nathanael’s unconscious thoughts. These 
small grunts and groans serve to further entice Nathanael, as opposed to turning him off and 
making him lose his attraction to her.  
 
Silence as objet petit a in Transference 
To use Lacanian terms, transference love between Nathanael and Olimpia emerges from 
silence and a lack of speech, because silence entices the subject to fill the lack and thereby 
seduces him. Simply put, the analysand (i.e., Nathanael) assumes that the analyst (i.e., 
Olimpia) possesses profound knowledge that holds the key to curing his symptoms. Thus, 
transference arises from Nathanael’s language addressed to Olimpia (as the subject tries to 
address the big Other). Olimpia’s silence and limited speech confirm his desire and produce 
the love between them. Why does Nathanael find Olimpia’s muteness so intriguing? The 
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silence is a kind of void—objet petit a—around which Nathanael can articulate his insatiable 
desire. By addressing the big Other, what Nathanael really hears back is the echo of his own 
voice (Lacan, Seminar Ⅱ 244). More specifically, Olimpia’s silence, or mechanical sounds 
(“ach, ach!”), is objet petit a as the Voice (one of the guises of objet petit a). It is because of 
this void that Nathanael can produce and thereby make sense of something out of nothing—
Olimpia’s mechanical nature and muteness. Nathanael expects a response from Olimpia as 
the analysand hopes to get a profound answer from the analyst—the subject who is supposed 
to know. Nathanael is not only responsible for what he says to the “analyst,” but he also 
needs to provide himself a response to what he says. The response from himself through the 
big Other fulfills his narcissistic pursuit: essentially, he turns his own speech into the voice of 
Olimpia through the loop of its void. He repeats the process of talking to Olimpia because 
“repetition is fundamentally the insistence of speech” (Lacan, Seminar III 242). The big 
Other is where the speech is constituted (ibid. 274).  
Now, the question at stake is why can Clara not evoke the same desire from 
Nathanael? Is she not, in reality, the one who actually tries to be an “analyst” to cure 
Nathanael? Here, it is necessary to examine more closely Lacan’s account of transference, as 
he suggests that it is even better if the analyst is blind to the transference so that she is “well 
suited to contain within herself the object of that desire” (Seminar VIII 193). In other words, 
there is no contingency on the degree to which the analyst should understand the analysand: 
as Lacan says precisely, “the less you understand the better you listen” (Seminar II 141). One 
problem of understanding [compréhension] is, according to Lacan, that the analyst simply 
applies what he or she already knows to the speech of the analysand, so that he or she 
believes there is an understanding between them (Seminar VIII 197). This understanding is 
not perceived as positive and is what Lacan calls the “liminal understanding” (ibid. 204). It is 
therefore crucial for the analyst to ignore the theory that he or she is already familiar with. 
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Lacan goes as far as to claim that the analytic relationship can only be developed through an 
initial misunderstanding (ibid. 389). As a consequence, the passive Olimpia is perceived by 
Nathanael as a better analyst than the active Clara. Apart from this negativity of 
understanding, the passivity rather than activity of the analyst can evoke more “free 
associations” of the analysand, with the result that the analyst becomes the object of the 
analysand’s desire. Indeed, Clara’s problem is that she talks and analyzes too much and gives 
Nathanael advice that is far too concrete: “Sei überzeugt, daß diese fremden Gestalten nichts 
über Dich vermögen; nur der Glaube an ihre feindliche Gewalt kann sie Dir in der Tat 
feindlich machen” (Hoffmann 384). Although the big Other is described as the subject who is 
supposed to know, the knowledge of the big Other comes from the attribution or confession 
of the subject him- or herself. The big Other should not be seen as someone who actually 
knows everything about the subject. This is why Nathanael calls Clara “Du lebloses, 
verdammtes Automat” despite the fact that Clara is the person who actively helps to cure him 
(Hoffmann 393).20 Thus, the mechanism of the analytic session functions only when the 
interpretation during the analytic session is subjectivized by the analysand. As Žižek would 
say: “[y]es, my God, that’s me, I really wanted this” (“Desire: Drive = Truth: Knowledge” 1).  
 
Childhood Trauma and Narcissistic Projection 
Through the lens of transference love, it is now clear how love between Nathanael and 
Olimpia is artificially produced by one active lover (analysand) and one passive beloved 
 
20 In the plot, Clara asks Nathanael to throw away the disturbing poem he wrote about Coppelius. The irony is that when, 
later, Nathanael reads to Olimpia the poem and the mysteries that have bored Clara, the only response he receives from 
Olimpia is “ach, ach.” Yet Nathanael is still convinced that Clara is the automaton and Olimpia is the lively person who truly 
understands him. The difference between Clara and Olimpia is that Clara does not fit Nathanael’s fantasy frame; in other 
words, Nathanael cannot project his fantasy onto Clara but only onto Olimpia.  
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(analyst). However, the detailed analysis above still does not answer the final question I 
proposed earlier: since the love between Nathanael and Olimpia can be artificially created, 
can it also be destroyed? Or simply put, how does this love eventually dissolve? Lacan 
expands the theory of transference by drawing attention to reproduction behind the theory:  
The reality of transference is thus the presence of the past. Isn’t there already something 
that stands out in this, allowing us to provide a more complete formulation? It is a 
presence that is a bit more than presence—it is a presence in action and, as the German 
[Übertragung] and French [transfert] terms indicate, a reproduction. (Seminar VIII 174) 
Indeed, it is Nathanael’s childhood trauma relating to the Sandman and Nathanael’s 
ambivalent relationship with the father figure that creates the transference love and 
idealization of Olimpia. It is not a coincidence that Olimpia is created by the Doppelgänger of 
the Sandman (i.e., Professor Spallanzani); Olimpia is therefore the sister-image of Nathanael 
so that Nathanael can project his narcissistic features onto her (Dolar, “Lacan and the 
Uncanny” 9). 
In his essay “The Uncanny,” Freud regards Olimpia as Nathanael’s sister-image that 
embodies his castration complex and his ambivalent relationship with the father figure. On 
the one hand, Nathanael tries to identify with the father; on the other, he offers himself as an 
object of love for the father (what Freud calls the “feminine attitude”): “Diese automatische 
Puppe kann nichts anderes sein als die Materialisation von Nathaniels femininer Einstellung 
zu seinem Vater in früher Kindheit” (XII. Band 244).  
Nathanael’s narcissistic projection and Olimpia as the cold, mute mirror surface 
function analogously to Lacan and Žižek’s discussion of the courtly love tradition in 
medieval literature: Nathanael is the knight who elevates the Lady Olimpia to the status of 
Ideal and Impossible—a disavowal and avoidance of a fully sexual relationship with her.  
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Courtly Love and the Lady 
Lacan and Žižek’s criticism of courtly love begins with the cliche of the knight pursuing the 
Lady, but the Lady always rejecting his advances; the Lady is marked as the unattainable 
object. The following passage from Lacan is worth quoting:  
The Lady is never characterized for any of her real, concrete virtues, for her wisdom, 
her prudence, or even her competence. If she is described as wise, it is not because 
she embodies an immaterial wisdom or because she represents its functions more than 
she exercises them. On the contrary, she is as arbitrary as possible in the tests she 
imposes on her servant. (Seminar VII 150) 
The Lady is not a warm, charming lover but rather a cold person, an “inhuman partner” who 
is not “one of our fellow-beings” (ibid.). Žižek compares the Lady to an automaton, who 
evokes the knight’s desire at random (The Metastases of Enjoyment 90). But why can the 
knight not see the cold nature of the Lady, instead imagining her as an ideal partner? This is 
not because the knight is blinded by love and cannot see the flaw of the Lady. On the 
contrary, the elevation of the Lady as the Ideal is a secondary phenomenon of the knight’s 
narcissistic projection that attempts to make the traumatic Otherness of the Lady impossible.  
Essentially, this elevation of the Lady as unattainable is idealization: an idealized 
object (i.e., the Lady) is pursued in order not to be obtained. The enjoyment of idealization 
lies in the process of pursuing itself: a happy ending of the knight obtaining the Lady will not 
do any good but will ruin this jouissance of repetitively pursuing.   
 
Amor Interruptus and Masochism 
 75 
The dialectic of courtly love is perverse, and it is not until the emergence of the masochist 
couple that we understand its logic. Lacan was not the one who directly pointed out the 
association between courtly love and masochism, although in Seminar VII, he makes a 
passing remark on the postponing nature of courtly love:  
The techniques involved in courtly love—and they are precise enough to allow us to 
perceive what might on occasion become fact, what is properly speaking of the sexual 
order in the inspiration of this eroticism—are techniques of holding back, of 
suspension, of amor interruptus. (152) 
Later, it was Žižek who puts forward Lacan’s thoughts by linking this amor 
interruptus to masochism. Lacan and Žižek point to the obstacles that the knight or the 
masochist sets up in the game of chasing so that the Lady or the woman-master becomes 
unattainable: “external hindrances that thwart our access to the object are there precisely to 
create the illusion that, without them, the object would be directly accessible—what such 
hindrances thereby conceal is the inherent impossibility of attaining the object” (Žižek, The 
Metastases of Enjoyment 94).  
The Lady is a mere void who therefore can be perceived only through fantasy. The 
knight fantasizes about attaining the Lady through endless postponement, precisely as the 
masochist suspends fully sexual enjoyment through a contract. The knight behaves as the 
man-servant to the woman-master, carefully remaining a reflexive distance from the Lady 
and repetitively pursuing her in order to not obtain her. The sexuality of the logic is “when a 
gesture that ‘officially’ serves some instrumental goal becomes an end in itself, when we start 
to enjoy the very ‘dysfunctional’ repetition of this gesture, and thereby suspend its 
purposefulness” (ibid. 127).  
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The masochistic nature of the contract can only take place when the subject is 
perverse, because a perfectly symmetrical relationship is only possible in a well-negotiated 
contract between the dialectic of master and slave. In an actual relationship, symmetry only 
exists in the imaginary illusion.  
 
Sublimation and the Thing 
For Nathanael, Olimpia is not only an idealized object but also a sublimated Thing. Before 
arriving at this point, it is necessary first to understand what sublimation is. Sublimation 
[Sublimierung] first arose in psychoanalysis when Freud defined it as the process of 
transferring libido into socially appreciable and well-celebrated achievements.21 Lacan, 
however, in Seminar VII, reverses how Freud defines sublimation. Lacan proposes an equally 
enigmatic formula, in which he claims that sublimation has to do with a process that “raises 
an object…to the dignity of the Thing” (Seminar VII 112). At first sight, this formula 
suggests nothing different from idealization: the ordinary everyday object becomes the 
representation of the Thing. It is true that at some point Lacan himself becomes confused by 
the formula and does not clearly articulate the difference between sublimation and 
idealization in his teaching. However, Joan Copjec suggests that the elevation in the Lacanian 
sublimation does not equate to entailing of the representation of the Thing; instead, there are 
moments when the elevation entails “the substitution of an ordinary object for the Thing” 
(37). The difference between representation and substitution is that the first still requires an 
object as the Thing, while the latter, by contrast, directly replaces the Thing and gains its 
satisfaction elsewhere instead of stubbornly waiting for the arrival of the Thing. It is 
important to understand that this Thing is not an idealized object situated in the imaginary but 
 
21 See Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents [Das Unbehagen in der Kultur].  
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something that firmly reflects “dumb reality” (Lacan, Seminar VII 55). In other words, 
idealization means an idealized image of the Thing that cannot be concretized, yet 
sublimation elevates an object to the position of the Thing, and it does not matter what this 
object actually is. Through sublimation, the fantasized objet petit a is reduced to being an 
ordinary object. Now, through this reversal of the elevation, it is possible to have a more 
complete and precise understanding of the Lacanian sublimation: this sublimation exists 
without the fantasy of the idealized object. It is also different from the Freudian sublimation 
insofar as Lacan’s sublimated object can exist without the detour of libido to something 
commonly considered more ideal or more socially acceptable. What Lacan urges his readers 
to do is to accept this most “dirty” part of libido, surrendering the hope of using the elevation 
to represent an ideal or to attain some arbitrary enjoyment.  
Therefore, two crucial aspects mark the main distinction between Freudian and 
Lacanian sublimation: firstly, the object of the Freudian sublimation is something that is 
originally refuted by the society and has to go through the process of sublimation to become 
what is considered socially acceptable. For Freud, sublimation is achieved via culture; only 
cultured people can achieve sublimation. By contrast, Lacan rejects the idea that sublimation 
can be “achieved” through the cultural transformation of the object. The first difference leads 
to the second one: while Freudian sublimation alters the object itself (from socially 
unacceptable to cultural), Lacanian sublimation does not change the object per se but rather 
how the subject perceives the object (i.e., the structure of fantasy that surrounds the object).  
 
Nathanael’s Perversion and Self-Deception 
To return to The Sandman: what makes Nathanael similar to a knight or a masochist is that 
despite his claim of wanting an intimate relationship with Olimpia, he is in reality afraid of a 
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sexual relationship and creates barriers of endless postponement as a result. The Lady, or 
Olimpia, becomes a symbol for both enjoyment and castration. This is also why he cannot 
love Clara—a woman who tries hard to approach him, to cure him, in order to have a full 
relationship with him. As mentioned earlier, it is not a sudden realization that Nathanael finds 
out Olimpia’s mechanical nature; like the knight and the masochist, he knows from the very 
beginning that this love can only take place through idealization with precise control and 
reflexive distance. A double self-deception occurs in the story, and Nathanael’s perverse 
behavior signifies the first aspect of this: he knows that he cannot fall in love with an 
automaton so that he needs to use a telescope to look at her and thereby to appreciate her; 
without a telescope, there would have been no love. This is the first self-deception. The 
second self-deception occurs at the moment when Nathanael directly confronts Olimpia’s 
mechanical nature (i.e., when he sees her being dismembered): “Erstarrt stand Nathanael – 
nur zu deutlich hatte er gesehen, Olimpias toderbleichtes Wachsgesicht hatte keine Augen, 
statt ihrer schwarze Höhlen; sie war eine leblose Puppe” (407). Nathanael rejects his own 
disavowal of her nature by trying to convince himself that he loved her because he did not 
know who she really was. He deceives himself about the need for a fantasy frame to fall in 
love and believes his love for Olimpia is authentic. The irony, and the challenge Hoffmann 
poses to his Romantic contemporaries, is this obsession with the so-called authentic love, in 
which external formalities (i.e., “obstacles”) should be eliminated and subjective feelings 
should be the only determinator. This Romantic obsession paradoxically leads to the most 
inauthentic love: essentially, it is not love but passionate desire. Yet it is crucial to note that 
the lesson from the story is not that we should have no fantasy, as rejecting a fantasy structure 
precisely results in another kind of idealization. Here, Hofmann’s conception of fantasy 
aligns with Hegel and Lacan: it is a necessity for the subject to create a fantasy structure that 
is not directly related to his or her partner in order to fall in love, but what is ethically at stake 
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is that although the subject knows precisely that there are differences between fantasy and 
reality, he or she loves the person nonetheless.22 Nathanael, by contrast, hides behind his 
perversion through this double self-deception, thereby legitimizing his pathological behavior.  
 
Does Nathanael Have Freedom?  
The other question that needs to be answered is whether Nathanael plays an active role in this 
transference love. In other words, does Nathanael have freedom in terms of starting and 
ending the relationship with Olimpia? Is he, as some literature suggests, also an unfortunate 
automaton who lacks humanness? This question concerns the problem of subjectivity, which 
was a central theme of early Romanticism, when whoever did not have absolute freedom was 
considered a kind of automaton. 
Elizabeth Purcell points out this “crisis of subjectivity” in The Sandman, arguing that 
the fate of Nathanael is not determined by Nathanael himself; instead, he is an automaton that 
is controlled by someone else and has no actual freedom in terms of subjectivity (45). Purcell 
believes the proof of her argument can be seen in the following quotation from the story:  
Alles, das ganze Leben war ihm Traum und Ahnung geworden; immer sprach er 
davon, wie jeder Mensch, sich frei wähnend, nur dunklen Mächten zum grausamen 
Spiel diene, vergeblich lehne man sich dagegen auf, demütig müsse man sich dem 
fügen, was das Schicksal verhängt habe. Er ging so weit, zu behaupten, daß es töricht 
 
22 This marks a crucial distinction between the logic of desire and drive: desire, as can be seen in Nathanael’s case, is the 
obsession with the argument of “this is not that,” whereas drive qua sublimation enables the subject to accept “this is that” 
(Žižek, “Hegel on Marriage” 7). Therefore, in the case of authentic sublimation, even when the subject realizes his or her 
partner does not match his or her ideal image or fantasy, the subject still loves the partner. Therefore, the fantasy for love is 
not created around the partner but around the loving disposition itself.  
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sei, wenn man glaube, in Kunst und Wissenschaft nach selbsttätiger Willkür zu 
schaffen; denn die Begeisterung, in der man nur zu schaffen fähig sei, komme nicht 
aus dem eignen Innern, sondern sei das Einwirken irgendeines außer uns selbst 
liegenden höheren Prinzips. (Hoffmann 390) 
Purcell thereby argues that Hoffmann is using the character, Nathanael, to criticize Kant’s 
moral subjects. She considers that the Kantian moral subjects only appear to be free. The 
subjective freedom is constrained by the objective moral Law. This interpretation appears to 
be valid at first sight, but two problems of her argument immediately arise: firstly, it is not 
the case that Kant’s moral subject has no choice but must behave in accordance with the 
moral Law; instead, it is, in reality, the subject makes choices and uses the moral Law as an 
excuse for his or her immoral behavior. The reason why some scholars, such as Purcell, 
understand Kant’s moral philosophy in the way that they do is that they believe the big Other 
as a third element restricts the freedom of the subject, preventing the subject from doing what 
he or she actually wants to do. However, psychoanalysis points out that “there can be no 
freedom without a subject, yet the very emergence of the subject is already the result of a 
free act” (Zupančič, Ethics of the Real 41). This means that the path of subjectivization 
requires the subject to situate him- or herself in the position of the desiring subject of the big 
Other, as a part of the big Other, and the subject learns how to become an other and desires 
like the big Other. In other words, the very process of becoming a subject is already a free act 
insofar as one has to voluntarily submit oneself to the big Other. Therefore, the very decision 
of becoming a subject is “always-already” free.  
However, what if Nathanael is manipulated by reality and childhood trauma and 
therefore has no choice but to behave pathologically? To answer this question, it is necessary 
to recall the story of a jealous husband that Lacan tells in Seminar III. In this story, a 
pathologically jealous husband follows his wife and witnesses that she is in the same 
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bedroom as another man (Lacan, Seminar III 76). Even though the husband’s suspicion that 
his wife is being unfaithful could very much be true, this does not change the fact that his 
behavior is pathological. Nathanael is a free subject in a similar vein even if he is controlled 
by his horrifying childhood character, the Sandman. The big Other that pertains to 
Nathanael’s childhood trauma does not know more about him because the traumatic 
experience is suppressed. The paranoiac big Other is the one who knows him more.  
The difference between a masochistic pervert (i.e., Nathanael) and the Kantian subject 
is that the enjoyment of a pervert is obtained through instrumentalization: “[t]he subject here 
makes him the instrument of the Other’s jouissance” (Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject 
and the Dialectic of Desire” Écrits 697). Nathanael is the instrument of the big Other instead 
of enjoying the Other jouissance. The difference between the one who is an instrument of the 
big Other and the one who enjoys the Other jouissance is that the former acts this way only 
because he knows it is prohibited so that he will never enjoy a full sexual relationship: “the 
pervert is a subject who directly assumes the paradox of desire and inflicts pain in order to 
enable enjoyment, who introduces schism in order to enable reunion, and so on” (Žižek, The 
Metastasis of Enjoyment 111). The purpose of a pervert is not to actually enjoy his partner 
sexually; it is the instrumental, non-sexual relationship itself that excites and provokes him. 
The way that a pervert achieves a non-sexual relationship is through putting in place 
artificially created external obstacles: “[i]t is a highly refined way of making up for (suppléer 
à) the absence of the sexual relationship, by feigning that we are the ones who erect an 
obstacle thereto” (Lacan, Seminar XX 69). The subject who enjoys the Other jouissance, 
however, attempts to fulfill the desire of the big Other and thereby obtains the enjoyment by 
subjectivizing herself in the big Other.  
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To conclude, his traumatic childhood does not make Nathanael less pathological. 
Instead, what makes a subject pathological is the attempt to justify the pathological nature of 
love and desire.  
 
De-Idealization without De-Sublimation as Ethical Love 
Despite his use of different narrators in the story, in the following paragraph Hoffmann gives 
a clear refusal of idealizing one’s beloved:  
Aber viele hochzuverehrende Herren beruhigten sich nicht dabei; die Geschichte mit 
dem Automat hatte tief in ihrer Seele Wurzel gefaßt und es schlich sich in der Tat 
abscheuliches Mißtrauen gegen menschliche Figuren ein. Um nun ganz überzeugt zu 
werden, daß man keine Holzpuppe liebe, wurde von mehrern Liebhabern verlangt, 
daß die Geliebte etwas taktlos singe und tanze, daß sie beim Vorlesen sticke, stricke, 
mit dem Möpschen spiele u.s.w., vor allen Dingen aber, daß sie nicht bloß höre, 
sondern auch manchmal in der Art spreche, daß dies Sprechen wirklich ein Denken 
und Empfinden voraussetze. Das Liebesbündnis vieler wurde fester und dabei 
anmutiger, andere dagegen gingen leise auseinander. “Man kann wahrhaftig nicht 
dafür stehen”, sagte dieser und jener. In den Tees wurde unglaublich gegähnt und 
niemals genießet, um jedem Verdacht zu begegnen. (Hoffmann 408–409) 
Hoffmann explains that as a result of Nathanael’s story, many young men fear their partners 
being mere automata; hence, young men expect their female partners to accomplish various 
activities such as singing [singen], dancing [tanzen], stitching [sticken], knitting [stricken], 
playing with their puppy [mit dem Möpschen spielen], and so on, all at the same time. What 
Hoffmann criticizes here is another kind of idealization: in order to avoid having an 
automaton as a beloved, the lover demands that the beloved pretend not to be an automaton—
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despite being more oblique, this demand is still an idealization, because it can be understood 
as the lover saying to his or her beloved, “I can love you only if you behave in this and that 
way.” The most ethical love will exist when, although the lover knows the beloved is an 
automaton, he or she simply de-idealizes the beloved and accepts the reality. Ethical love is 
not about idealizing one’s partner and treating him or her as someone who represents or 
embodies an ideal object. It is important to note that it is not the case that Nathanael is unable 
to sublimate Olimpia—after all, he does disavow her flaws and intentionally blinds himself 
through two self-deceptions, as already discussed. The problem here is that in their love, 
sublimation cannot survive without idealization: “[in] true love, there is no need for an 
idealization of its object, no need to ignore the object’s discordant features” (Žižek, Less than 
Nothing 449).23 In other words, it is Nathanael’s inability to undergo the experience of de-
idealization that makes ethical love impossible. So, what should ethical love look like? In 
ethical love, the partner is de-idealized but not necessarily de-sublimated (Žižek, “Hegel on 
Marriage” 7). To better make sense of this point, we return to Hegel in a moment.  
To sum up, the love between Nathanael and Olimpia stems from transference: 
Olimpia fulfills Nathanael’s desire as a make-believe analyst, the subject who is supposed to 
know and who remains silent and gives him no concrete advice. This love dissolves because 
of Nathanael’s lack of capacity for de-idealization: what the masochistic Nathanael wants is 
not an actual partner; instead, all he wants is a fetishized Lady-Object who embodies his 
idealization and passionate desire to repetitively pursue her without having a fully sexual 
 
23 Žižek’s story story about a blinded ex-soldier is a good example of sublimation with idealization:  
In an old Christian melodrama, a temporarily blinded ex-soldier falls in love with the nurse who takes care of him, 
fascinated by her goodness, forming in his mind an idealized image of her; when his blindness is cured, he sees 
that, in her bodily reality, she is ugly. Aware that his love would not survive extended contact with this reality, and 
that he inner beauty of her good soul has a higher value than her external appearance, he intentionally blinds 
himself by looking into the sun for too long, so that his love for the woman will survive. (Less than Nothing 448) 
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relationship with her. Only in a masochistic world is the symmetry between two subjects 
possible.  
 
Hegel’s Contingent Partner 
In the first chapter, I pointed out the link between the dialectic of the drive and the Hegelian 
arranged marriage. What that chapter left unanswered was how drive results in repetition. 
The purpose of not addressing this point in the earlier chapter is that this point will make 
more sense in the context of the repetition that occurs in Nathanael’s case. To recapitulate the 
Hegelian arranged marriage: Hegel claims that arranged marriage is the most ethical form of 
love not because the elder has better vision in terms of matchmaking but rather because “the 
contingency of the partner is directly and openly assumed” (PR §162; Žižek, “Hegel on 
Marriage” 5)  
Nathanael’s story and Hegel’s arranged marriage stand for two different kinds of 
repetition: the repetition of desire and the repetition of the drive. The repetition in 
Nathanael’s love for Olimpia is desire because Nathanael repetitively pursues the Lady-
Object in order to not obtain her; each time, the repetition results in the same outcome: 
avoidance of a fully sexual relationship. By contrast, the repetition occurring in Hegel’s 
arranged marriage is the repetition of the drive insofar as the subject is well aware of the love 
and commitment even if the other subject is not his or her idealized partner.24 The Hegelian 
 
24 I use the example of arranged marriage here because this is what Hegel claims to be the most ethical form of love possible. 
The arranged marriage means that two subjects who are deemed marriageable do not evaluate each other on external 
qualities. They simply decide to love each other regardless, which makes arranged marriage possess the best qualities. They 
simply decide to love each other regardless, which makes arranged marriage the best example of sublimation without 
idealization. 
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repetition is not simply repeating the same thing, because the latter would be the form of 
desire as opposed to drive. Repetition, for Hegel, is a form that retroactively produces and 
posits something that is always-already present in the first place. The symbolic ceremony that 
repeats the couple’s decision to marry is not a mere bureaucratic procedure but a necessity 
that forever changes the couple’s subjective positions. For Hegel, the repetition of the 
decision to love is necessary insofar as “it is only through its repetition that the inner notional 
necessity is asserted” (Žižek, Sex and the Failed Absolute 210), because repetition would 
cause the “sublation” [Aufhebung] that results in the contingent necessity (ibid.). This is why 
Hegel insists on the necessity of the wedding ceremony insofar as it is through repetition that 
the subject can sublimate his or her partner.  
One of the most crucial distinctions between desire and drive is their different ways in 
which they are satisfied. The best example of the repetition of the drive is the story of Don 
Juan. In this story, Don Juan pursues all kinds of women, regardless of their different external 
qualities or identities. The matter at stake for Don Juan is not who is the right woman; rather, 
every woman is the right one for him. Zupančič frames this as “one of the purest instances of 
repetition compulsion” insofar as what Don Juan constantly looks for is not a new woman but 
a new experience of conquering a Woman (Ethics of the Real 131). The other characteristic 
of Don Juan is that the pleasure of enjoying women occurs one by one (une par une), 
whereby he finds the satisfaction of the drive is achieved through his action (Lacan, Seminar 
XX 10). Don Juan does not move to the next woman because he thinks the previous one was 
not the right one (Zupančič, Ethics of the Real 136). What motivates Don Juan to keep 
sleeping with different women is the repetition compulsion insofar as he thinks every woman 
is the right one (ibid.). Nathanael, on the other hand, repeats his behavior of pursuing an 
automaton because of failure. This is what Lacan calls encore, the satisfaction of being 
dissatisfied so that the subject wants to repeat the dissatisfaction (Fink, “Knowledge and 
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Jouissance” Reading Seminar XX 34). Hence, Don Juan’s repetition derives from his being 
satisfied every time, so that the satisfaction repeats through the action of pursuing, whereas 
Nathanael’s repetition stems from the satisfaction that comes out of being dissatisfied in 
terms of a fully sexual relationship.  
Finally, how is the case of Don Juan and Nathanael related to Hegel’s arranged 
marriage? They are related because, in an arranged marriage, the subjects who already know 
that they are supposed to marry each other still repeat the process during the wedding 
ceremony. The repetition is inscribed in the language and shifts their enunciation. The 
satisfaction of an arranged marriage is achieved through repeating the decision at the 
symbolic ceremony. The satisfaction is not gained directly through the object (i.e., the 
partner); instead, the satisfaction comes from a formal, symbolic ceremony. To put it in an 
extreme way, the person whom one is going to marry does not matter to the Hegelian subject; 
the satisfaction of love stems from the process of becoming married. Lacan’s words on drive 
should clarify my argument:  
Even when you stuff the mouth—the mouth that opens in the register of the drive—it 
is not the food that satisfies it, it is, as one says, the pleasure of the mouth. That is 
why, in analytic experience, the oral drive is encountered at the final term, in a 
situation in which it does no more than order the menu. This is done no doubt with the 
mouth, which is fundamental to the satisfaction—what goes out from the mouth 
comes back to the mouth, and is exhausted in that pleasure what I have just called, by 
reference to the usual terms, the pleasure of the mouth. (Seminar XI 167–168) 
Indeed, the satisfaction of the drive arises from the very act of doing something—eating, 
pursuing, speaking, and so on. As opposed to drive, desire attempts to gain its satisfaction 
from the object (the menu, food, a woman, and so on). The satisfaction of desire is because 
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desire can never be fully satisfied; while the satisfaction of the drive will always repeat 
insofar as the drive cannot rid itself of the satisfaction in its action. The repetition of the drive 
does not have a goal of satisfying anything; it is precisely because of this lack of goal that the 
repetition itself becomes satisfying.25 
 
Conclusion 
In Romantic love, the lover’s attempt to pursue the higher objective, authentic love results in 
his or her most intimate subjectivity; whereas in ethical love, the contingency of the partner is 
directly and openly assumed. In this account, it is no wonder that Hegel claims he prefers 
arranged marriage over marriage of attraction. For Hegel, what distinguishes arranged 
marriage from marriage out of “free love” is not that the elders who arrange a marriage 
necessarily have a more prolonged vision, nor does he suggest that those elders could 
objectively and adequately assess two people’s qualities and thereby make the best decision 
in terms of matchmaking; what is ethically at stake is the contingent partner. Here, Hegelian 
ethical love parallels Lacanian sublimation: even though the partner does not meet the 
idealized image of an object, he or she remains the sublimated object, the Thing, around 
whom drive is articulated.  
 
25 Žižek’s words summarize the difference between desire and drive well: “[i]nstead of trying to obtain the jouissance that 
cannot be obtained, the drive finds its jouissance through the very act of pursuing: desire desperately strives to achieve 
jouissance, its ultimate object which forever eludes it; while drive, on the contrary, involves the opposite impossibility—not 
the possibility of attaining jouissance, but the impossibility of getting rid of it” (The Ticklish Subject 354).  
 88 
Indeed, Hegel and Hoffmann did not have many explicit associations or encounters 
during their lifetime,26 yet one can clearly see their mutual juxtaposition of Lacanian ethics: 
even though the partner does not meet the idealized image, marriage elevates the partner, the 
ordinary object, to the position of the Thing. The repetition at play is that of drive as opposed 
to desire, which repeats for the sake of not being satisfied, drive is always-already satisfied. It 
can be concluded that The Sandman is a literary embodiment of Hoffmann’s rejection of 
Romantic desire and idealization: true love is not two lovers looking at each other and 
passionately falling in love with one another inwardly, so that love overcomes all external 
obstacles—on the contrary, things that appear to be external obstacles enact the most ethical 
love possible. Moreover, the topic of subjectivity and freedom is also crucial to 
understanding The Sandman; the story should be seen as a criticism of the Romantic 
discourse that requires absolute subjective freedom insofar as freedom is already embedded 
in the act of becoming a subject. The story shows the (masochistic) perverse relationship to 
the big Other, wherein the pervert enjoys an instrumental relationship with the big Other so 
that his desire can be forever deferred and postponed.  
The devastating logic of transference love, as seen in Nathanael’s case, makes one 
realize that a loving disposition is far from what we think in postmodern times. In ethical 
love, the positions between two lovers are “not only distinct but above all unequal” 
(Moroncini 12). This means that one subject plays an active role, yet the other subject 
remains passive. The relationship is thus not aligned from subject to subject but from subject 
to object (ibid.). Because the difference between ethical and Romantic love is the structure of 
 
26 Even though, from Hegel’s LA, it can never be known for sure if Hegel extensively spoke of Hoffmann, his reference to 
Hoffmann there does count as a documented reference. 
 89 
fantasy, while the beloved remains fantasized and idealized in Romantic love, to an ethical 
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